

AN
ESSAY
ON THE
NATURE
OF
TRUE VIRTUE.

It does not consist in the morosity of a Cynick, in the severity of an Ascetick, in the demureness of a Precisian, nor in the fulleness of a Quaker: it is neither in a drooping head, a mortified face, or a primitive beard: but it is something very different from, and much more excellent than all this.

NORRIS'S ESSAYS.

By Jonathan Edwards.

L O N D O N:

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MDCCLXXVIII.



TO THE
RIGHT REVEREND
THE LORD BISHOP OF
Litchfield and Coventry.

My LORD,

IT has been the misfortune
of many a great man, whose
abilities have been eminently

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supe-

superior to those of mankind in general, to pass unnoticed by the literary world, for want of Patronage and Sanction. So that society has suffered, when it might have been essentially benefited; while modest merit has been concealed in shameful obscurity.

Such Reflections must frequently have passed your Lordship's breast, with an elegance of conception peculiar to yourself; and will no doubt be admitted as an apology for the liberty which a stranger has taken

taken in addressing the following pages to You, and laying them at your Lordship's feet in humble hope of encouragement and protection.

That such a procedure is by no means unprecedented or original, a certain dedication, prefixed to a very concise and masterly reply to, that disgrace to Religion, Reason, and Philosophy, *the Author of the natural history of Religion*, can testify*.

A 3

Your

* It is reported, upon good authority, that, of all the publications which appeared against that Gentleman's writings,
nothing

Your Lordship, it is presumed, will not be displeased at the imitation of such an example. Besides that, it is impossible for so great an Admirer and Judge of Science, to be backward to introduce to the Literati of his own age, what might otherwise perish in oblivion. And what may more immediately demand your Lordship's attention is, that the Work itself is in some sort calculated to display the excellency of that divine Revelation, which

nothing mortified his vanity and affectation so much as his Lordship's remarks on his Essay, &c. Printed for *Cadell* in the *Strand*.

which it is the glory of this country to believe, and your Lordship's high office and honour to defend.

Very few subjects have engaged the thoughts, or employed the pens of the studious more than that of VIRTUE. But, it is much to be lamented, that the generality of those, who have made their sentiments public, have treated it in a light which ought to reflect but little credit upon themselves, as it has led the Reader's view from the

great standard of unnerring truth, the BIBLE.

That this has been the case, one of our Universities, distinguished for the study of natural and moral philosophy, is an unhappy proof. Where the minds of our youth are too soon vitiated and corrupted from the divine simplicity of the Scriptures, by what no despicable

Writer calls, *την φιλοσοφίαν και κενην απαλην, καλα την παραδοσιν των ανθρωπων, καλα τα σοιχεια τε κοσμου, και ε καλα Χριστον.*

Not that we would be understood to decry or disparage human Science, but only to observe

serve upon the abuse and per-
 version of it, when not correct-
 ed by the sacred Writings. We
 have seen in too many instan-
 ces, both ancient and modern,
 what are the sad effects of *philo-*
sophy, falsely so called, when not
 under the direction of *true piety*.
 And universal history has shewn
 us into what misery, confusion
 and error the *light of nature*,
 without the superior light of
divine Revelation, has plunged
 the human race. Nevertheless,
 there is much cause to fear that
 we are advancing towards those
 dregs of time, in which the pride
 of

of infidelity seems determined rather to follow the *ignis fatuus* of *Reason* and *Philosophy* at all events, than to submit to the sure guidance of *inspired Truth*.

We are happy to find your Lordship a bold and able Exception to this remark. That, tho' in an exalted station, you *dare to be wise* *, and to attempt at least, *et in magnis voluisse sat est*, to stem that dreadful torrent, which might, in its issue, with a worse than *Ætnæan* eruption, overthrow both Church and State ;

* Aude sapere——

State; and to stand forth an
undaunted Champion for the
cause of God and the christian
faith.

It may be proper to acquaint
your Lordship, that, the author
of the following Essay is now
numbered with the mighty dead;
beyond the reach of earthly cen-
sure or of praise; his writings,
however, will in all probability
preserve his memory to the latest
period of time. And that your
Lordship, by your patronization
of this little treatise, may be
the happy Instrument of lead-
ing

(xii)

ing many to the knowledge of
TRUE VIRTUE, who want no-
thing but this to make them
really great and good, is the ear-
nest wish of

My Lord,

Your Lordship's

Most obedient

and respectful humble Servant,

THE EDITOR.

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THE
N A T U R E
O F
T R U E V I R T U E.

C H A P. I.

*Shewing wherein the Essence of true
Virtue consists.*

W HATEVER controversies and
variety of opinions there are
about the nature of Virtue, yet all
(excepting some sceptics, who deny
any real difference between Virtue
B and

and Vice) mean by it something *beautiful*, or rather some kind of *beauty*, or excellency. It is not *all* beauty, that is called Virtue ; for instance, not the beauty of a building, of a flower, or of the rainbow : but some beauty belonging to Beings that have *perception* and *will*. It is not all beauty of *mankind*, that is called Virtue ; for instance, not the external beauty of the countenance, or shape, gracefulness of motion, or harmony of voice : but it is a beauty that has its original seat in the mind. But yet perhaps, not *every* thing that may be called a beauty of mind, is properly called Virtue. There is a beauty of understanding and speculation. There is something in the
 ideas

ideas and conceptions of great Philosophers and Satesmen, that may be called beautiful; which is a different thing from what is most commonly meant by Virtue. But Virtue is the beauty of those qualities and acts of the mind, that are of a *moral* nature; that is, such as are attended with desert or worthiness of *praise* or *blame*. Things of this sort, it is generally agreed, so far as I know, are not any thing belonging meerly to speculation, but to the *disposition* and *will*, or (to use a general word, I suppose pretty well understood) to the *heart*. Therefore I presume I shall not depart from the common opinion, when I say, that Virtue is the beauty of the qua-

lities and exercises of the heart, or of those actions which proceed from them.

So that when it is enquired, What is the nature of true *Virtue*? This is the same as to enquire, What that is which renders any habit, disposition, or exercise of the heart truly *beautiful*? I use the phrase *true Virtue*, and speak of things *truly beautiful*, because I suppose it will generally be allowed, that there is a distinction to be made between some things which are truly virtuous, and others which only seem to be virtuous, through a partial and imperfect view of things: that some actions and dispositions appear beautiful if considered partially and superficially,

perfcially, or with regard to *some* things belonging to them, and in some of their circumftances and tendencies, which would appear otherwife in a more extenfive and comprehensive view, wherein they are feen clearly in their whole nature, and in the extent of their connections in the univerfality of things.

There is a general and a particular beauty. By a *particular* beauty I mean that by which a thing appears beautiful when confidered only with regard to its connection with, and tendency to some particular things within a limited, and, as it were, a private fphere. And a *general* beauty is that by which a thing appears beautiful when viewed

most perfectly, comprehensively, and universally, with regard to *all* its tendencies, and its connections with *every* thing it stands related to. The former may be without and against the latter. As a few notes in a tune taken only by themselves, and in their relation to one another, may be harmonious; which, when considered with respect to all the notes in the tune, or the entire series of sounds they are connected with, may be very discordant and disagreeable *. Of which more afterwards.

That

* This view of things may serve to reconcile us to some very ingenious, though, to many, exceptionable remarks, which are to be found in a late treatise upon the Internal Evidence of the Christian Religion, page 50—6, containing some original observations upon *Valour, Patriotism, and Friendship*.

That only, therefore, is what I mean by true Virtue, which is *that* belonging to the *heart* of an intelligent Being, which is beautiful by a *general* beauty, or beautiful in a comprehensive view, as it is in itself, and as related to *every thing*, that it stands in connection with. And therefore, when we are enquiring concerning the nature of *true Virtue*, namely, wherein this true and general beauty of the heart does most essentially consist, this is my answer to the enquiry.

TRUE VIRTUE most essentially consists in benevolence to Being in general. Or perhaps, to speak more accurately, it is that consent, propensity, and union of

heart to Being in general, which is immediately exercised in a general good-will.

The things which were before observed of the nature of true Virtue, naturally lead us to such a notion of it. If it has its seat in the *heart*, and is the general goodness and beauty of the disposition, and exercise of the heart, in the most comprehensive view, considered with regard to its universal tendency, and as related to every thing it stands in connection with; in what can it consist, but in consent and good-will to Being in general? Beauty does not consist in discord and dissent, but in consent and agreement*.

And

* See HUTCHESON'S Enquiries into our Ideas of Beauty.

And, if every intelligent Being is some way related to Being in general, and is a part of the universal system of existence ; and so stands in connection with the whole ; what can its general and true beauty be, but its union and consent with the *great whole*?

If any such thing can be supposed as an union of heart to some particular Being, or number of Beings, disposing it to benevolence to a private circle or system of Beings, which are but a small part of the whole ; not implying a tendency to an union with the great system, and not at all inconsistent with enmity towards Being in general ; this I suppose not to be of the nature of true Virtue, although

although it may in some respects be good, and may appear beautiful in a confined and contracted view of things. But of this more afterwards*.

It is abundantly plain by the holy Scriptures, and generally allowed, not only by Christian divines, but by the more considerate Deists, that Virtue most essentially consists in *Love*. And I suppose it is owned by the most eminent writers, to consist in general love of benevolence, or kind affection: though it seems to me, the meaning of some in this affair is not sufficiently explained; which perhaps occasions much

* See SOAME JENYNS'S View of the Internal Evidence, &c. as above.

much error and confusion in discourses on this subject*.

When I say, true Virtue consists in love to Being in general, I shall not be likely to be understood, that no one act of the mind or exercise of love is of the nature of true Virtue, but what has Being in general, or the great system of universal existence, for its direct and immediate object; so that no exercise of love or kind affection to any one particular Being, that is but a small part of this whole, has any thing of the nature of true Virtue—But that the nature of true Virtue consists, in a *disposition* to benevolence towards *being in general*.

Though

* See Smith's theory of moral Sentiments, Part 6. Sect. 2. and Bishop BUTLER'S Analogy.

Though from such a disposition may arise exercises of love to particular Beings, as objects are presented and occasions arise. No wonder, that he who is of a generally benevolent disposition, should be more disposed than another to have his heart moved with benevolent affection to particular persons, whom he is acquainted and conversant with, and from whom arise the greatest and most frequent occasions of exciting his benevolent temper. But my meaning is, that no affections towards particular Persons, or Beings, are of the nature of true Virtue, but such as arise from a generally benevolent temper, or from that habit or frame of mind, wherein consists

a disposition to love Being in general. And perhaps it is needless for me to give notice to my readers, that when I speak of an intelligent Being's having a heart united and benevolently disposed to Being in general, I thereby mean *intelligent* Being in general. Not inanimate things, or beings that have no perception or will ; which are not properly capable objects of benevolence.

LOVE is commonly distinguished into love of benevolence and love of complacence. Love of *benevolence* is that affection or propensity of the heart to any Being, which causes it to incline to its well-being, or disposes it to desire and
take

take pleasure in its happiness. And if I mistake not, it is agreeable to the common opinion, that beauty in the object is not always the ground of this propensity; but that there may be such a thing as benevolence, or a disposition to the welfare of those who are not considered as beautiful, unless mere existence be accounted a beauty. And benevolence or goodness in the divine Being is generally supposed, not only to be prior to the beauty of many of its objects, but to their existence: so as to be the ground both of their existence and their beauty, rather than they the foundation of God's benevolence; as it is supposed that it is God's goodness which
 moved

moved him to give them both Being and beauty *. So that if all Virtue primarily consist in that affection of heart to Being, which is exercised in benevolence, or an inclination to its good, then God's Virtue is so extended as to include a propensity not only to Being actually existing, and actually beautiful, but to possible Being, so as to incline him to give Being, Beauty and Happiness. But not now to insist particularly on this. What I would have observed at present is, that it must be allowed, benevolence doth not necessarily presuppose Beauty in its object.

What is commonly called love of *complacence*, presupposes beauty.

For

* See KING on the Origin of Evil. Chap. 5.

For it is no other than delight in Beauty; or complacence in the person or being beloved for his Beauty.

If Virtue be the Beauty of an intelligent Being, and Virtue consist in love, then, it is a plain inconsistency, that Virtue primarily consists in any love to its object for its beauty; either in a love of complacence, which is delight in a Being for his Beauty, or in a love of benevolence, which has the beauty of its object for its foundation. For that would be to suppose, that the beauty of intelligent Beings primarily consists in love to beauty; or that their virtue first of all consists in their love to Virtue. Which is an inconsistency and going in a circle.

cle. Because it makes Virtue or beauty of mind the first motive or foundation of that love wherein Virtue originally consists, or wherein the very first Virtue consists; or, it supposes the first Virtue to be the consequence and effect of Virtue. So that Virtue is originally the foundation and exciting cause of the very beginning or first being of Virtue. Which makes the first cause both the ground and the consequence, both the cause and effect of itself.

Doubtless Virtue primarily consists in something else, besides any effect or consequence of Virtue. If Virtue consist primarily in love to Virtue, then Virtue, the thing loved,

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is

is the love of Virtue: so that Virtue must consist in the love of the love of Virtue. And if it be enquired, what that Virtue is, which Virtue consists in the love of the love of, it must be answered, it is the love of Virtue: so that there must be the love of the love of the love of Virtue, and so on *in infinitum*. For there is no end in going back in a circle. We never come to any beginning or foundation. For it is without beginning, and hangs on nothing. Therefore, if the essence of Virtue or beauty of mind lie in love, or in a disposition to love, it must primarily consist in something *different* both from complacence, which is a delight in beauty,

beauty, and also from any benevolence that has the beauty of its object for its foundation. Because, it is absurd to say that Virtue is primarily and first of all the consequence of itself. For this makes Virtue primarily prior to itself. Nor can Virtue primarily consist in *gratitude*; or one Being's benevolence to another for his benevolence to him. Because this implies the same inconsistency. For it supposes a benevolence prior to gratitude, which is the cause of gratitude. Therefore the first benevolence, or that benevolence which has none prior to it, cannot be Gratitude.

There is room therefore left for no other conclusion, than that the

primary object of virtuous love is Being, simply considered ; or, that true Virtue primarily consists, not in love to any particular Beings, because of their Virtue or beauty, nor in gratitude because they love us ; but in a propensity and union of heart to Being simply considered ; exciting *absolute* benevolence (if I may so call it) to Being in general. I say, true Virtue *primarily* consists in this. For I am far from asserting, that there is no true Virtue in any other love than this absolute benevolence. But I would express what appears to me to be the truth, on this subject, in the following particulars. The *first* object of a virtuous benevolence is *Being*, simply

ply considered; and if Being *simply* considered, be its object, then Being *in general* is its object; and the thing it has an ultimate propensity to, is the *highest good* of Being in general. And it will seek the good of every *individual* Being, unless it be conceived as not consistent with the highest good of Being in general. In which case the good of a particular Being, or some Beings, may be given up for the sake of the highest good of Being in general*.

c 3

And

* See KING on the Origin of Evil. Chap. 2. Sect. 9. Chap. 3. and 4. Sect. 6, 7, 8. Bishop BUTLER's Analogy, particularly his most invaluable preface to that excellent Work. HOPKINS's Sin a Benefit to the Universe. And BELLAMY's Wisdom of GOD in the permission of Sin.

And particularly if there be any Being that is looked upon as statedly and irreclaimably opposite and an enemy to being in general, then, consent and adherence to Being in general will induce the truly virtuous heart to forsake that Being, and to oppose it. And further, if Being simply considered, be the first object of a truly virtuous benevolence, then that Being, who has most of Being, or has the greatest share of existence, other things being equal, so far as such a Being is exhibited to our faculties or set in our view, will have the *greatest* share of the propensity and benevolent affection of the heart.—I say, *other things being equal*, especially because there is

a *secondary* object of virtuous benevolence, which I shall take notice of presently. Which is one thing that must be considered as the ground or motive of a purely virtuous benevolence. Pure benevolence in its first exercise, is nothing else but Being's united consent, or propensity to Being; appearing true and and pure by its extending to Being in general; and inclining to the general highest good, and to each Being, whose welfare is consistent with the highest general good, in proportion to the degree of *existence**

c. 4

under-

* I say, in proportion to the degree of *Existence*; because one Being may have more *existence* than another, as he may be *greater* than another. That which is *greater*, has more *existence*,

understood, other things being equal. The second object of a virtuous propensity of heart is *benevolent* Being.—A secondary ground of pure benevolence is *virtuous* benevolence itself in its object. When any one under the influence of
general

existence, and is farther from nothing, than that which is *little*. One Being may have every thing positive belonging to it, or every thing which goes to its positive existence, in opposition to defect, in an higher degree than another; or a greater capacity and power, greater understanding, every faculty and every positive quality in an higher degree. An *Archangel* must be supposed to have more existence, and to be every way further removed from *non-entity* than a *Worm* or a *Flea*.

See KING's Origin of Evil. Page 121, 2.
131, 2, 142, 144, 449, 450.

general benevolence, sees another Being possessed of the like general benevolence, this attaches his heart to him, and draws forth greater love to him, than merely his having existence ; because, so far as the Being beloved has love to Being in general, so far his own being is, as it were, enlarged ; extends to and in some sort comprehends Being in general : and therefore, he who is governed by love to Being in general, must of necessity have complacence to him, and the greater degree of benevolence to him, as it were out of gratitude to him for his love to general existence, which his own heart is extended and united to, and so looks on its interest as
his

his own. It is because his heart is thus united to Being in general, that he looks on a benevolent propensity to Being in general, wherever he sees it, as the beauty of the being in whom it is; an excellency, which renders him worthy of esteem, complacence, and the greater good-will. But several things may be noted more particularly concerning this secondary ground of a truly virtuous love.

1st, That loving a Being on *this ground* necessarily arises from pure benevolence to Being *in general*, and comes to the same thing. For he who has a simple and pure good-will to general entity or existence, must love that temper in others, that agrees and conspires with

with itself. A spirit of consent to Being must agree with consent to Being. That, which truly and sincerely seeks the good of others, must approve of, and love that which joins with it in seeking the good of others.

2dly, This, which has been now mentioned as a secondary ground of virtuous love, is the thing wherein true moral or spiritual *beauty* primarily consists. Yea, spiritual beauty consists wholly in this, and in the various qualities and exercises of mind which proceed from it; and in the external actions which proceed from these internal qualities and exercises. And in these things consists all true *Virtue*, namely, in
the

the love of Being, and of the qualities and acts which arise from it.

3dly, As all spiritual beauty lies in these virtuous principles and acts, so it is primarily *on this account*, that they are beautiful, namely, that they imply *consent* and *union* with Being *in general*. This is the primary and most essential beauty of every thing that can justly be called by the name of Virtue, or that is any moral excellency in the eye of one who has a perfect view of things. I say,—the *primary* and *most essential* beauty,—because there is a secondary and inferior sort of beauty, which I shall take notice of afterwards.

4thly,

4thly, This spiritual beauty, which is but a *secondary* ground of a virtuous benevolence, is the ground, not only of benevolence, but of *complacence*, and is the *primary* ground of the latter; that is, when the complacence is truly virtuous. Love to us in particular, and kindness received, may be a secondary ground; but this is the primary objective foundation of it.

5thly, It must be noted, that the *degree* of the *amiableness*, or *valuableness* of true Virtue, primarily consisting in consent and a benevolent propensity of heart to Being in general, in the eyes of one who is influenced by such a spirit, is not in the *simple* proportion of the degree

gree of benevolent affection seen, but in a proportion *compounded* of the *greatness* of the benevolent Being, or the degree of *Being*, and of the degree of *benevolence*. One, who loves Being in general, will necessarily value good-will to Being in general, wherever he sees it. But if he see the same benevolence in *two* Beings, he will value it *more* in two, than in one. Because it is a greater thing, more favourable to Being in general, to have two Beings to favour it, than only one of them. For there is more Being, that favors Being: both together having more Being than one alone. So, if one Being be as great as two, have as much existence as both together, and

and have the same degree of general Benevolence, it is more favourable to Being in general than if there were general benevolence in a Being which had but half that share of existence. As a large quantity of gold, with the same degree of preciousness, that is, with the same excellent quality of matter, is more valuable than a small quantity of the same metal.

6thly, It is impossible that any one should *relish* truly this beauty consisting in general benevolence, who has *not* that temper himself. I have observed, that if any Being be possessed of such a temper, he will unavoidably be pleased with the same temper in another. And it
may

may in like manner be demonstrated, that it is such a spirit, and nothing else, which will relish such a spirit; for if a Being, destitute of benevolence, should love benevolence to Being in general, it would prize and seek that for which it had no value. Because to love an inclination to the good of Being in general, would imply a loving and prizing the good of Being in general. For how should one love and value a *disposition* to a thing, or a *tendency to promote* a thing, and for that very reason, because it tends to promote it,—when the *thing* itself is what he is regardless of, and has no value for, nor desires to have promoted.

C H A P.

C H A P. II.

*Shewing how that love, wherein true
Virtue consists, respects the divine
Being and created Beings.*

FROM what has been said, it is evident, that true Virtue most chiefly consists in love to God; the Being of Beings, infinitely the greatest and best of Beings. This appears, whether we consider the primary or secondary ground of virtuous love. It was observed, that the *first* objective ground of that love, wherein true Virtue consists, is Being, simply considered; as a necessary consequence of this, that

D Being,

Being, who has the most of Being, or the grèatest share of universal existence, has or should have, proportionally the grèatest share of virtuous benevolence, so far as such a Being is exhibited to the faculty of our minds, other things being equal. But, God has infinitely the grèatest share of existence, or is infinitely the grèatest Being. So that all other Being, even that of all created things whatsoever, throughout the whole universe, is as nothing in comparison of the divine Being*.

And

* "In the scale of Beings, all Objects ought to be loved in proportion to their degree of beauty or perfection. And consequently, the highest

And if we consider the *secondary*
ground of love, namely, beauty or
moral

highest degree of perfection ought to be loved with the highest degree of love, and the several subordinate degrees of perfection, with proportionate degrees of the affection of the mind. And since finite, when compared with infinite, vanishes quite, or becomes nothing, it follows necessarily (since there is but one Object that is infinitely good and perfect, and all others are but created and finite, that is, in comparison are nothing) that, according to the eternal and immutable laws of analogy, the One supreme Good, endued with infinite perfection, ought to be loved with a love infinitely superior to our affections for other things."

"This is the true philosophy of the matter; and as much a demonstration as any thing in Number or Geometry can possibly be, however it may be received.

moral excellency, the same thing will appear. For as God is infinitely

And, as infinite perfection requires infinite love, or the highest degree of love we can give it; so all other Objects are to be loved with a love proportioned to their perfection; but as they can only be finite, the proportion of our love to them and to infinite perfection ought to be as infinite is to finite."

Dr CHEYNE.

"To love things amiable in the degree they are amiable, is the summary of natural religion: for it is treating things according to their natures, and rendering them their proper due. Truth and justice may be speculative notions, but if our affections be regulated, if our heart be set right, then actual *Virtue* must ensue."

"Again, By the laws of gravitation all bodies tend to their center, and at the same time

nately the greatest Being, so he is
 allowed to be infinitely the most
 beau-

time they attract and are attracted by each other. The center draws them all, so as comparatively to supersede their mutual attractions; yet in reality they have such attraction: and though the center be with respect to each of them as almost infinite to unity; yet they still keep the proportion of units among themselves. Analogous to this universal law of the material world, Religion, Reason, Nature, Truth, Justice, and the fitness of things, all enjoin us to love God with all our hearts, and our neighbour as ourselves. By this all pure spirits, I mean spirits in a state of perfection, tend to God as their center, with an unparalleled vehemence. The force here is as infinite to One, and their respective action among themselves, is as units,

beautiful and excellent : and all the beauty to be found throughout the whole creation is but the reflection of
 infomuch as they are individuals of the same nature."

Dr HEYLIN.

" If there be in nature such a service as affection and love, there remains then only to consider of the object, whether there be really that supreme One we suppose. For if there be in nature a supreme Mind or Deity, we have then an object consummate, and comprehensive of all that is good and excellent. And this Object of all others must of necessity be the most amiable, the most engaging, and of highest satisfaction and enjoyment. As Beings partake of this they are fair, flourishing, and happy: as they are lost to this, they are deformed, perished, and lost."

Characteristicks, vol. 2.

of the diffused beams of that Being who hath an infinite fulness of brightness and glory. GOD's beauty is infinitely more valuable than that of all other Beings upon both those accounts mentioned, namely, the *degree* of his virtue, and the *greatness* of the Being possessed of this virtue. And GOD has sufficiently exhibited himself in his Being, his infinite greatness and excellency, and has given us faculties, whereby we are capable of plainly discovering immense superiority to all other beings, in these respects.

Therefore, he who has true Virtue, consisting in benevolence to Being in general, and in compla-

cence in Virtue, or moral beauty, and benevolence to virtuous Being, must necessarily have a supreme love to God; both of benevolence and of complacence. And all true Virtue must radically and essentially, and as it were summarily, consist in this: because God is not only infinitely greater and more excellent than all other Being, but he is the head of the universal system of existence; the foundation and fountain of all Being and all beauty; from whom all is entirely derived, and on whom all is most absolutely and wholly dependent; *of whom and through whom and to whom* is all being and all perfection; and whose Being and beauty

beauty are, as it were, the sum and comprehension of all existence and excellence, much more than the sun is the fountain and summary comprehension of all the light and brightness of the day.

If it should be objected, that Virtue consists primarily in benevolence, but that our fellow-creatures, and not God, seem to be the most proper objects of our benevolence; inasmuch as *our goodness extendeth not to God, and we cannot be profitable to him.*—To this I answer,

1st, A benevolent propensity of heart is exercised, not only in *seeking to promote* the happiness of the Being, towards whom it is exercised,

cised, but also in *rejoicing* in his happiness. Even as gratitude for benefits received will not only excite endeavours to requite the kindness we receive, by equally benefiting our benefactor, but also, if he be above any need of us, or we have nothing to bestow, and are unable to repay his kindness, it will dispose us to rejoice in his prosperity.

2dly, Though we are not able to give any thing to God, which we have of our own, independently; yet we may be the instruments of promoting *his glory*; in which he takes a true and proper *delight*. (As will be shewn at large in a treatise on God's end in creating the world,
chap.

chap. i. sect. 4. whither I must refer the reader for a more full answer to this objection.)

Whatever influence such an objection may seem to have on the minds of some, yet, is there any one that owns the being of a God, who will deny that any love or benevolent affection is due to God, and proper to be exercised towards him? If no *benevolence* is to be exercised towards God, because we cannot profit him, then for the same reason, neither is *gratitude* to be exercised towards him for his benefits to us; because we cannot requite him. But where is the man who believes

a God and a providence, who will say this?

There seems to be an inconsistency in some writers on morality, in this respect, that, though they do not wholly exclude a regard to the *Deity* out of their schemes of morality, yet they mention it so slightly, that they leave me room and reason to suspect they esteem it a less important and subordinate part of true morality; and insist on *benevolence* to the *created system* in such a manner, as would naturally lead one to suppose, they look upon that as by far the most important and essential

tial thing in their scheme*. But
why should this be? If true Virtue
consist

* “ To love the public, to study universal good, and to promote the interest of the whole world, as far as lies within our power, is surely the *height* of goodness, says my Lord SHAFTESBURY, and makes that temper which we call *divine*.”

If it be allowed that *Morals*, as distinguished from *Religion*, more *immediately* respect our duty to our fellow-men, while Religion respects our duty to GOD, this author has ran directly into this method of writing. “ For, says he, if we are told a man is religious, we shall ask, What are his *Morals*? But if we hear at first that he has honest moral principles, and is a man of *natural justice* and good temper, we seldom think of the other question, whether he
be

consist partly in a respect to God, then doubtless it consists *chiefly* in it. If true morality require that we should have some regard, some bene-

be religious."—Agreeable to this avowed neglect, not to say contempt, of the Deity, his Lordship, whenever he is speaking of that virtue and entire goodness of temper, which has the public, universal good for its object, generally limits his Universe to the *Species*, exclusive of the Deity. For instance—"That a creature may deserve the name of good or virtuous, says his Lordship, he must have all his inclinations and affections suitable to the good of his *kind*; or of that *system* in which he is included, and of which he is himself a *Part*. To stand thus well affected, not only in respect of one's self, but of Society and the Public; this is *Rectitude, Integrity or Virtue*.

benevolent affection to our Creator, as well as to his creatures, then doubtless it requires the *first* regard to be paid to him; and that he be every way the *supreme* object of our benevolence. If his being above our reach, and beyond all capacity of being profited by us, do not hinder but that nevertheless he is the proper object of our love, then it does not hinder but that he should be loved according to his *dignity*, or according to the degree in which he has those things wherein worthiness of regard consists, so far as we are capable of it. But this worthiness, none will deny, consists in these two things, *greatness* and moral *goodness*.

ness. And those who own a God, do not deny that he exceeds all other Beings in these. If the Deity is to be looked upon as within that system of Beings which properly terminates our benevolence, or belonging to that whole, certainly he is to be regarded as the *head* of the system and the *chief* part of it; if it be proper to call him a *part* who is infinitely more than all the rest, and in comparison of whom and without whom all the rest are nothing, either as to *beauty* or *existence*. And therefore certainly, unless we will be atheists, we must allow that true Virtue does primarily and most essentially consist in a supreme love to God; and that,

that, where this is wanting, there can be no true Virtue.

But this being a matter of the highest importance, I shall say something further to make it plain, that love to God is most essential to true Virtue; and that no benevolence whatsoever to other Beings can be of the nature of true Virtue without it.

And therefore let it be supposed, that some Beings, by natural instinct or by some other means, have determination of mind to union and benevolence to a *particular person* or *private system**, which is but a small

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part

* It may here be noted, that when hereafter I use such a phrase as, *private system* of Beings,

part of the universal system of Being: and that this disposition or determination of mind is independent on, or not subordinate to benevolence to *Being in general*. Such a determination, disposition or affection of mind is not of the nature of true Virtue *.

This Beings, or other similar to it, I thereby intend any system or society of Beings that contains but a small part of the great system which comprehends the *universality* of existence. I think, that may well be called a *private system*, which is but an infinitely small part of the *great whole* to which we stand related. I therefore also call that affection, *private Affection*, which is limited to so narrow a circle: and that, *general Affection* or *Benevolence*, which has *Being in general* for its Object.

* Such as Patriotism, Valour, Friendship, &c in the common acceptance of those terms.

This is allowed by all with regard to *self-love*, in which good-will is confined to one single person*.

And there are the same reasons, why any other private affection or good-will, though extending to a society of persons, independent on and subordinate to benevolence to the universality, should not be esteemed truly virtuous. For, notwithstanding it extends to a number of persons, which taken together are more than a single person, yet, the whole falls infinitely short of the universality of existence; and if put in the scales with it, has no greater proportion to it than a single person.

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* See *Characteristics*, vol. 2. p. 22.

However, it may not be amiss more particularly to consider the reasons why *private affection*, or good-will limited to a particular circle of Beings, falling infinitely short of the whole existence, and not dependent upon it, nor subordinate to general benevolence, cannot be of the nature of true Virtue.

1st, Such a private affection, detached from general benevolence and independent on it, as the case may be, will be *against* general benevolence, or of a contrary tendency; and will set a person *against* general existence, and make him an enemy to it.—As it is with *selfishness*, or when a man is governed by a regard to his own private interest,

terest, independent on regard to the public good; such a temper exposes a man to act the part of an enemy to the public. As in every case wherein his private interest seems to clash with the public; or in all those cases wherein such things are presented to his view, as suit his *personal* appetites or *private* inclinations, but are inconsistent with the good of the public. On which account a selfish, contracted, narrow spirit is generally abhorred, and is esteemed base and fordid.

But if a man's affection take in half a dozen more, and his regards extend so far beyond his own single person as to include his children and family; or if it reach further still,

to a larger circle, but fall infinitely short of the universal system, and is exclusive of Being in general; his private affection exposes him to the same thing, namely, to pursue the interest of its particular object in *opposition* to general existence; which is certainly contrary to the tendency of true Virtue; yea, directly contrary to the main and most essential thing in its nature, the thing on account of which chiefly its nature and tendency is good. For the chief and most essential good that is in Virtue, is, its favouring Being in general. Now certainly if private affection to a limited system had in itself the essential nature of Virtue, it would be impossible,

fible, that it should in any circumstance whatsoever have a tendency and inclination directly *contrary* to that wherein the essence of Virtue chiefly consists.

2dly, Private affection, if not subordinate to general affection, is not only liable, as the case *may* be, to issue in enmity to Being in general, but has a *tendency* to it, as the case certainly *is*, and must necessarily be. For he, who is influenced by private affection, not subordinate to regard to Being in general; sets up his particular or limited object *above* being in general; and this most naturally tends to enmity against the latter, which is by right the great supreme, ruling, and absolute sovereign ob-

ject of our regard. Even as the setting up another Prince as supreme in any Kingdom, distinct from the lawful sovereign, naturally tends to enmity against the lawful sovereign.

Wherever it is sufficiently published, that the supreme, infinite, and all-comprehending Being requires a supreme regard to himself; and insists upon it, that our respect to him should universally rule in our hearts, and every other affection be subordinate to it, and this under the pain of his displeasure (as we must suppose it is in the world of intelligent creatures, if God maintain a moral kingdom in the world *) then,

* And that he does maintain such a Kingdom, see BUTLER's Analogy.

then, a consciousness of our having chosen and set up another Prince to rule over us, and subjected our hearts to him, and continuing in such an act, must unavoidably excite enmity*, and fix us in a stated opposition, to the supreme Being. This demonstrates, that affection to a private society or system, independent on general benevolence, cannot be of the nature of true Virtue. For this would be absurd, that it should have the nature and essence of true virtue, and yet, at the same time, have a *tendency opposite* to true virtue.

3dly, Not only would affection to a private system, un subordinate to regard

* See Rom. viii. 7.

regard to Being in general, have a tendency to opposition to the supreme object of virtuous affection, as its effect and consequence, but would become *itself* an opposition to that object. Considered by itself in its nature, detached from its effects, it is an instance of great opposition to the rightful supreme object of our respect. For it exalts its private object above the other great and infinite object; and sets that up as supreme, in opposition to this. It puts down Being in general, which is infinitely superior in itself and infinitely more important, in an inferior place; yea, subjects the supreme general object to this private; infinitely inferior object: which

which is to treat it with great contempt, and truly to act in opposition to it; and to act in opposition to the true order of things, and in opposition to that which is infinitely the supreme interest; making this supreme and infinitely important interest, as far as in us lies, to be subject to, and dependent on, an interest infinitely inferior. This is to act against it, and to act the part of an enemy to it. He, who takes a subject and exalts him above his Prince, and sets him up as supreme instead of the Prince, and treats his Prince wholly as a subject, therein acts the part of an enemy to his Prince.

From these things, I think, it is manifest, that no affection limited
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to any private system, not dependent on, nor subordinate to, Being in general, can be of the nature of true Virtue; and this, whatever the private system be; let it be more or less extensive, consisting of a greater or smaller number of individuals, so long as it contains an infinitely little part of universal existence, and so bears no proportion to the great all-comprehending system.— And consequently, that no affection whatsoever to any creature, or to any system of created Beings, which is not dependent on, nor subordinate to a propensity or union of the heart to God, the supreme and infinite Being, can be of the nature of true Virtue.

From

From hence also it is evident, that the *divine Virtue*, or the virtue of the divine Mind, must consist primarily in *love to himself*; or, in the mutual love and friendship which subsists eternally and necessarily between the several persons in the Godhead; or in that infinitely strong propensity there is in these divine persons one to another. There is no need of multiplying words, to prove that it must be thus, on a supposition that virtue in its most essential nature consists in benevolent affection or propensity of heart towards Being in general; and so flowing out to particular Beings, in a greater or lesser degree, according to

to the measure of existence and beauty which they are possessed of.

It will also follow from the foregoing observations, that God's goodness and love to created Beings, is derived from, and subordinate to his love to himself. (In what manner it is so, is in some measure explained in the discourse of God's *end in creating the world* *.)

With respect to the manner in which a virtuous love in *created* Beings, *one to another*, is dependent on, and derived from love to God, this will appear by a proper consideration of what has been said; that it

* Which will very shortly appear, if this invaluable Essay meet with the attention and reception it deserves.

it is sufficient to render love to any created Being virtuous, if it arise from the temper of mind wherein consists a disposition to love God supremely. Because, it appears from what has been already observed, that all *that* love to *particular Beings*, which is the fruit of a benevolent propensity of heart to *Being in general*, is virtuous love. But, as has been remarked, a benevolent propensity of heart to Being in general, and a temper or disposition to love God supremely, are in effect the same thing. Therefore, if love to created Being come from that temper or propensity of the heart, it is virtuous. — However,
every

every particular exercise of love to a creature may not *sensibly* arise from any exercise of love to God, or from an *explicit* consideration of any similitude, conformity, union or relation to God, in the creature beloved.

The most proper *evidence* of love to a created Being, of its arising from that temper of mind wherein consists a supreme propensity of heart to God, seems to be, the agreeableness of the kind and degree of our love to God's *end* in our creation and in the creation of all things; and to the coincidence of the exercises of our love, in their manner, order and measure, with the *manner* in which God himself exercises love to the creature in the creation and govern-

government of the world; and to the way in which God, as the first cause and supreme disposer of all things, has respect to the creature's happiness, in subordination to himself as his own supreme end. For the true virtue of created Beings is doubtless their highest excellency, and their true goodness, and that by which they are especially agreeable to the mind of their Creator. —But the *true goodness* of a thing (as was observed before) must be its agreeableness to its *end*, or its fitness to answer the design for which it was made. Or, at least, this must be its goodness in the eyes of the Workman.—Therefore, they are good moral agents, whose

F temper,

temper of mind or propensity of heart is agreeable to the *end* for which God made moral agents. But as has been shewn*, the last end for which God made moral agents, must be the last end for which God has made all things; it being evident, that the moral world is the end of the rest of the world; the inanimate and unintelligent world being made for the rational and moral world, as much as a house is prepared for the inhabitants.

By these things it appears, that a truly virtuous mind, being as it were under the sovereign dominion of

* In the Treatise already referred to, upon God's *last End*, &c. &c.

of love to God, does above all things seek the *glory of God* and makes *this* its supreme, governing and ultimate end : consisting in the expression of God's perfections in their proper effects, and in the manifestation of God's glory to created understandings, and in the communications of the infinite fulness of God to the creature ; in the creature's highest esteem of God, love to God, and joy in God, and in the proper exercises and expressions of these.—

And so far as a virtuous mind exercises *true virtue in benevolence to created Beings*, it chiefly seeks the good of the creature, consisting in its knowledge or view of God's glory and beauty, its union with God, and

conformity to him, its love to him and joy in him.—And that temper or disposition of heart, that consent, union, or propensity of mind to Being in general, which appears chiefly in such exercises, is Virtue, truly so called; or, in other words, true grace and real holiness. And no other disposition or affection, but this, is of the nature of true Virtue.

Corollary. Hence it appears, that those *schemes* of religion or moral philosophy, which, however well, in some respects, they may treat of benevolence to *mankind*, and other virtues depending on it, yet have not a supreme regard to God, and love to him, laid in the *foundation*,
and

and all other virtues handled in a *connection* with this, and in a *subordination* to this, are not true schemes of philosophy, but are *fundamentally* and *essentially* defective*.—And whatever other benevolence or generosity towards mankind, and other virtues or moral qualifications which go by that name, any are possessed of, that are not attended with a *love to God*, which is altogether above them, and to which they are subordinate, and on which they are dependent, there is nothing of the nature of true virtue or religion in them.

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* And herein consists the fundamental and essential defect of every Treatise upon the nature of true Virtue which has hitherto appeared: against which we are particularly cautioned by an inspired penman in *Col. ii. 8.*

them.—And it may be asserted in general, that nothing is of the nature of true virtue, in which God is not the *first* and the *last*; or which, with regard to its exercises in general, has not its first foundation and source in apprehensions of God's supreme dignity and glory, and in answerable esteem and love of him, and respect to him, as the SUPREME
END.

C H A P. III.

Concerning the *secondary* and *inferior* kind of beauty.

THough this Virtue, which has been spoken of, alone, is justly esteemed

esteemed the true beauty of moral agents, or spiritual Beings: this alone being what would appear beautiful in them, upon a clear and comprehensive view of things: and therefore alone is the moral amiableness of Beings, which have understanding and will, in the eyes of him who perfectly sees all things as they are—Yet, there are other qualities, other sensations, propensities and affections of mind, and principles of action, which often obtain the epithet of *virtuous*, and by many are supposed to have the nature of true virtue: but which are intirely of a distinct nature from it, and have nothing of that kind in them; and therefore are errone-

ously confounded with real virtue :
—as may particularly and fully appear from things which will be observed in this and the following chapters.

That consent, agreement, or union of Being to Being, which has been spoken of, namely, the union or propensity of *minds* to mental or spiritual existence, may be called the highest, and first, or primary beauty, which is to be found amongst Beings that exist : as it is the proper and peculiar beauty of spiritual and moral Beings ; which are the highest and first part of the universal system, for whose sake all the rest has existence. Yet there is another, inferior,

rior, secondary beauty, which is some image of this, and which is not peculiar to spiritual Beings, but is found, even in inanimate things; which consists in a mutual consent and agreement of different things, in form, manner, quantity, and visible end or design; called by the various names of regularity, order, uniformity, symmetry, proportion, harmony, &c. Such is the mutual agreement of the various sides of a square, or equilateral triangle, or of a regular polygon. Such is, as it were, the mutual consent of the different parts of the periphery of a circle, or surface of a sphere, and of the corresponding parts of an ellipsis. Such is the agreement of the colours,
figures,

figures, dimensions, and distances of the different spots on a chess-board. Such is the beauty of the figures on a piece of chints or brocade. Such is the beautiful proportion of an human body, or countenance. And such is the sweet mutual consent and agreement of the various notes of a melodious tune.

This is what Mr. *Hutcheson*, in his treatise on beauty, expresses by uniformity in the midst of variety. Which is no other than the consent or agreement of different things, in form, quantity, &c. He observes that the greater the variety is in equal uniformity, the greater the beauty. Which is no more than
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to say, the more there are of different mutually agreeing things, the greater is the beauty. And the reason of that is, because it is more considerable to have many things consent one with another, than a few only.

The beauty which consists in the visible fitness of a thing to its use and unity of design, is not a distinct sort of beauty from this. For it is to be observed, that one thing which contributes to the beauty of the agreement and proportion of various things, is their relation one to another; which connects them, and introduces them together into view and consideration, and whereby one suggests the other to the mind,

mind, and the mind is led to compare them and so to expect and desire agreement. Thus the uniformity of two or more pillars, as they may happen to be found in different places, has not an equal degree of beauty, to that uniformity in so many pillars in the corresponding parts of the same building. So means and an intended effect are related one to another. The answerableness of a thing to its use is only the proportion, fitness and agreeing of a cause or means to a visibly designed effect, and so an effect so suggested to the mind by the idea of the means. This kind of beauty is not entirely different from that beauty which there is in fitting a mortise to

to its tenon. Only, when beauty consists in unity of design, or the adaptedness of a variety of things to promote one intended effect, in which all conspire, as in the various parts of an ingenious complicated machine, there is a double beauty as there is a twofold agreement and conformity. First, there is the agreement of the various parts to the designed end. Secondly, thro' this, namely, the designed end or effect, all the various particulars agree one with another as the general medium of their union, whereby they, being united in this third, are all united one to another.

The

The reason, or at least one reason, why God has made this kind of mutual consent and agreement of things beautiful and grateful to those intelligent Beings which perceive it, probably is, that there is in it some image of the true, spiritual, original beauty, which has been spoken of; consisting in Being's consent to Being, or the union of minds or spiritual Beings in a mutual propensity and affection of heart. The other is an image of this; because by that uniformity divers things become as it were one; as it is in this cordial union. And it pleases God to observe analogy in his works; as is manifest in fact in innumerable instances; and especially

cially to establish inferior things in an analogy to superior. Thus in how many instances has he formed brutes, in analogy to the nature of mankind? and plants in analogy to animals, with respect to their generation, nutrition, &c. And so he has constituted the external world in an analogy to things in the spiritual world, in numberless instances; as might be shewn, if it were necessary, and here were proper place and room for it*.

Why such analogy in God's works pleases him, it is not needful now to enquire. It is sufficient that he makes

* See BUTLER'S Analogy—undoubtedly a Work, the most finished and masterly upon this Subject, that has ever been written.

makes an agreement or consent of different things, in their form, manner and measure, &c. appear beautiful, *because* herein is some image of a higher kind of agreement and consent of spiritual Beings. It has pleased him to establish a law of nature, by virtue of which the uniformity and mutual correspondence of a beautiful plant, and the respect which the various parts of a regular building seem to have one to another, and their agreement and union, and the consent or concord of the various notes of a melodious tune, should appear beautiful; *because* therein is some image of the consent of mind of the different members of a society or system of

of intelligent Beings, sweetly united in a benevolent agreement of heart.

And here by the way, I would further observe, probably it is with regard to this image or resemblance, which secondary beauty has of true spiritual beauty, that God has so constituted nature, that the presenting this inferior beauty, especially in those kinds of it which have the greatest resemblance of the primary beauty, as the harmony of sounds, and the beauties of nature, might have a tendency to assist those whose hearts are under the influence of a truly virtuous temper; to dispose them to the exercises of divine love and enliven

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in them a sense of spiritual beauty.

From what has been said we may see, that there are two sorts of agreement or consent of one thing to another. (1.) There is a *cordial* agreement; which consists in concord and union of mind and heart: and which, if not attended (viewing things in general) with more discord than concord, is true Virtue, and the original or primary beauty; which is the only true *moral* beauty. —(2.) There is a *natural* union or agreement: which, though some image of the other, is entirely a distinct thing; the will, disposition, or affection of the heart having no concern in it, but consisting only in uniformity and consent of nature, form,

form, quantity, &c. (as before described) wherein lies an inferior, secondary sort of beauty; which may in distinction from the other, be called *natural* beauty.—This may be sufficient to let the reader know how I shall hereafter use the phrases of cordial, and natural agreement; and moral, spiritual, divine, primary, original beauty, and secondary or natural beauty.

Concerning this latter, inferior kind of beauty, the following things may be observed,

1st, The *cause* why secondary beauty is grateful to man, is only a *law of nature*, which God has fixed, or an *instinct* he has given to mankind; and not their perception

of the same thing which God is pleased to have regard to, as the ground or rule by which he has established such a law of nature.—

This appears in two things,

1st, That which God has a respect to, as the rule or ground of this law of nature which he has given us, whereby things having a secondary beauty, are made grateful to men, is their mutual agreement and proportion, in measure, form, &c. But in many instances, persons who are gratified, and have their minds affected by this secondary kind of beauty, do not reflect on that particular agreement and proportion, which, according to the law of nature,

nature, is the ground and rule of beauty, in the case; yea, are ignorant of it. Thus a man may be pleased with the harmony of the notes in a tune, and yet know nothing of that proportion or adjustment of the notes, which, by the law of nature, is the ground of the melody. He knows not, that the vibrations in one note regularly coincide with the vibrations in another; that the vibrations of a note coincide in time with two vibrations of its octave; and that two vibrations of a note coincide with three of its fifth, &c.—Yea, he may not know, that there are vibrations of the air in the case, or any corresponding motions in the organs.

of hearing, in the auditory nerve, or animal spirit.—So a man may be affected and pleased with a beautiful proportion of the features in a face, and yet not know what that proportion is, or what measures, quantities, and distances it consists in.

In this a sensation of secondary beauty differs from a sensation of primary and spiritual beauty, consisting in a spiritual union and agreement. What makes the latter grateful, is perceiving the union itself. It is the immediate view of that wherein the beauty fundamentally lies, which is pleasing to the virtuous mind,

(2.) As

(2.) As was observed before, God, in establishing such a law, that mutual natural agreement of different things, in form, quantity, &c. should appear beautiful or grateful to men, seems to have had regard to the image and resemblance there is in such a natural agreement, of that spiritual cordial agreement, wherein original beauty consists, as one reason why he established such a law. But it is not any reflection upon, or ^{ex}ception of, such a resemblance of this natural Beauty to spiritual beauty, that is the reason why such a form or state of objects appears beautiful to men : but their sensation of pleasure, on a view of this secondary beauty, is immedi-

ately owing to the law God has established, or the instinct he has given*.

2. Another thing observable concerning this kind of beauty, is that

* And hence it is that persons, who are blind to the charms of primary, moral, or spiritual Beauty, of true Goodness, Holiness, or Virtue, may be struck and captivated with those of natural Beauty: we see this in numerous instances, and in the basest Characters: and the reason is, because a discovery of, or taste for what is called natural or secondary Beauty does not depend upon any moral excellence, but upon the strength and degree of animal instinctive sensation: and we every where meet with people who have an uncommon taste for natural Beauty, for harmony of Sounds, proportion of Figures, &c. &c. who nevertheless disgust that which is the glory of the moral and rational World, *true Virtue.*

that it affects the mind more (other things being equal) when taken notice of in objects which are of considerable importance, than in little trivial matters. Thus, the symmetry of the parts of the human body or countenance affects the mind more than the beauty of a flower. So, the beauty of the solar system, more than as great and as manifold an order and uniformity in a tree. And the proportions of the parts of a church, or a palace, more than the same proportions in some little slight compositions, made to please children.

3. It may be observed (which was hinted before) that not only uniformity and proportion, &c. of
different

different things are requisite in order to this inferior beauty, but some relation or connection of the things thus agreeing one with another. As, the uniformity or likeness of a number of pillars, scattered hither and thither, does not constitute beauty, or at least by no means in an equal degree, as uniformity in pillars connected in the same building in parts that have relation one to another. So, if we see things unlike, and very disproportioned, in distant places, which have no relation to each other, this excites no such degree of deformity, as disagreement and inequality or disproportion in things related and connected; and the nearer the relation and the
 stricter

stricter the connection, so much the greater and more disgusting is the deformity, consisting in their disagreement.

4. This secondary kind of beauty, consisting in uniformity and proportion, not only takes place in material and external things, but also in things immaterial; and is, in very many things, plain and sensible in the latter, as well as in the former: and when it is so, there is no reason why it should not be grateful to them who behold it, in these, as well as in the other, by virtue of the same sense or the same determination of mind to be gratified with uniformity and proportion. If uniformity and proportion

portion be the things that affect, and appear agreeable to this sense of beauty, then, why should not uniformity and proportion affect the same sense in immaterial things, as well as material, if there be equal capacity of discerning it in both? And indeed *more* in spiritual things (*cæteris paribus*) as they are more important than things merely external and material?

This is not only reasonable to be supposed, but is evident in fact, in numberless instances. . There is a beauty of order in society, besides what consists in benevolence, or can be referred to it, which is of the secondary kind. As when the different members of society have all their
appointed

appointed office, place and station, according to their several capacities and talents, and every one keeps his place and continues in his proper business. In this, there is a beauty, not of a different kind from the regularity of a beautiful building, or piece of skilful architecture, where the strong pillars are set in their proper place; the pilasters in a place fit for them; the square pieces of marble in the pavement in places suitable for them; the pannels in the walls and partitions in their proper places; the cornishes in places proper for them, &c. As the agreement of a variety in one common design of the parts of a building, or complicated machine, is one instance of that regularity, which belongs

belongs to the secondary kind of beauty; so there is the same kind of beauty in immaterial things, in what is called *wisdom*, consisting in the united tendency of thoughts, ideas, and particular volitions, to one general purpose; which is a distinct thing from the goodness of that general purpose, as being useful and benevolent.

So there is a beauty in the virtue called *justice*, which consists in the agreementⁿ of different things, that have relation to one another, in nature, manner and measure: and therefore is the very same sort of beauty with that uniformity and proportion, which is observable in those external and material things
that

that are esteemed beautiful. There is a natural agreement and adaptedness of things, that have relation one to another, and an harmonious corresponding of one thing to another; that he, who from his will *does* evil to others, should *receive* evil from the will of others, or from the will of him or them whose business is to take care of the injured, and to act in their behalf: and that he should suffer evil in *proportion* to the evil of his doings. Things are in natural regularity and mutual agreement, not in a metaphorical but literal sense, when he, whose heart opposes the general system, should have the hearts of that system, or the heart of the head and ruler
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of the system, against him: and that in consequence, he should receive evil, in proportion to the evil tendency of the opposition of his heart*.

—So there is a like agreement of nature and measure, when he, who loves, has the proper returns of love; when he, who from his heart promotes the good of another, has his good promoted by the other; as there is a kind of justice in a becoming gratitude.

Indeed most of the duties incumbent on us, if well considered will be found to partake of the nature of justice. There is some natural

* See SMITH's Theory of moral Sentiment, page 2. sect. 2. And BELLAMY's Essay on "Vindictive Justice an amiable Attribute."

tural agreement of one thing to another; some adaptedness of the agent to the object; some answerableness of the act to the occasion; some equality and proportion of things of a similar nature, and of a direct relation one to another. So it is in relative duties; duties of children to parents and parents to children; duties of husbands and wives; duties of rulers and subjects; duties of friendship and good neighbourhood: and all duties that we owe to God, our creator, preserver and benefactor; and all duties whatsoever, considered as required by God, and as branches of our duty to him, and also considered as what are to be performed

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with relation to CHRIST, as acts of obedience to his precepts, and as testimonies of respect to him, and of our regard to what he has done for us, the virtues and temper of mind he has exercised towards us, and the benefits we have or hope for therefrom*.

It is this secondary kind of beauty, which belongs to the virtues and duties required of us, that Mr *Wollaston* seems to have had in his eye, when he resolved all virtue into an agreement of inclination, volitions and actions with *truth*†.

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* Hence *Merit* in the creature impossible in the nature of things. See CLARKE and BUTLER upon the subject of *Relations*.

† See a Book entitled, "The Religion of Nature delineated."

He evidently has respect to the *justice* there is in the virtues and duties that are proper to be in one Being towards another ; which consists in one Being's expressing such affections and using such a conduct towards another, as hath a natural agreement and proportion to what is in them, and to what we receive from them : which is as much a natural conformity of affection and action with its ground, object and occasion, as that which is between a true proposition and the thing spoken of in it.

But there is another and an higher beauty in true virtue, and in all truly virtuous dispositions and exercises, than what consists in any uni-

formity or similitude of various things; namely, *the union of heart to Being in general*, or to God the Being of Beings, which appears in those virtues; and of which those virtues, when true, are the various expressions or effects. Benevolence to Being in general, or to Being simply considered, is entirely a distinct thing from uniformity in the midst of variety, and is a superior kind of beauty.

It is true, that benevolence to being in general, when a person hath it, will naturally incline him to justice or proportion in the exercises of it. He, who loves Being simply considered, will naturally (as was observed before) other things

things being equal, love particular Beings, in a proportion compounded of the degree of Being, and the degree of virtue or benevolence to Being, which they have. And that is to love Beings in proportion to their dignity. For the dignity of a Being consists in these two things; respect to Being in this proportion, is the first and most general kind of justice; which will produce all the subordinate kinds. So that, after benevolence to Being in general exists, the proportion which is observed of objects, may be the cause of the proportion of benevolence to those objects: but no proportion is the cause or ground of the existence of such a thing as

benevolence to Being. The tendency of objects to excite that degree of benevolence, which is proportionable to the degree of Being, &c. is the *consequence* of the existence of benevolence; and not the ground of it. Even as a tendency of bodies one to another, by mutual attraction, in proportion to the quantity of matter, is the consequence of the being of such a thing as mutual attraction; and not attraction the effect of proportion.

By this it appears that *just* affections and acts have a *beauty* in them, distinct from, and superior to, the uniformity and equality there is in them: for which he, who has a truly virtuous temper, relishes and delights in them. And *that* is the expression and manifestation there is
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in them of benevolence to Being in general.—And besides this, there is the agreement of *justice* to the will and command of God, and also something in the tendency and consequences of justice, which is agreeable to general benevolence, namely, as in many respects it tends to the glory of God and the general good. Which tendency also makes it beautiful to a truly virtuous mind. So that the tendency of general benevolence to produce justice, also the tendency of justice to produce effects agreeable to general benevolence, both render justice pleasing to a virtuous mind. And it is on these accounts *chiefly*, that justice is grateful to a virtuous taste, or a tru-

ly benevolent heart. But though it be true, that there is that in the uniformity and proportion there is in justice, which is grateful to a benevolent heart, as this uniformity and proportion tends to the general good; yet, that is no argument that there is no other beauty in it but its agreeing with benevolence. For so the external regularity and order of the natural world gratifies benevolence, as it is profitable and tends to the general good; but that is no argument that there is no other sort of beauty in external uniformity and proportion but only its suiting benevolence by tending to the general good.

From

From all that has been observed concerning this *secondary* kind of beauty, it appears that that disposition or sense of the mind, which consists in determination of mind to approve and be pleased with this beauty, considered simply and by itself, has nothing of the nature of true virtue, and is intirely a different thing from a truly virtuous taste. For it has been shewn, that this kind of beauty is entirely diverse from the beauty of true virtue, whether it takes place in material or immaterial things. And therefore it will follow, that a taste for this kind of beauty is entirely a different thing from a true taste for virtue. Who will affirm, that a dispo-

disposition to approve of the harmony of good music, or the beauty of a square, or equilateral triangle, is the same as true holiness, or a truly virtuous disposition of mind! It is a relish of uniformity and proportion, which determines the mind to approve these things. And if this be all, there is no need of any thing higher, or of any thing in any respect diverse, to determine the mind to approve and be pleased with equal uniformity and proportion among spiritual things, which are equally discerned. It is virtuous to love true virtue, as that denotes an agreement of the heart with virtue. But it argues no virtue, for the heart to be pleased with

with that which is entirely distinct from it.

Though it be true, there is some analogy in it to spiritual and virtuous beauty; as much as material things can have analogy to things spiritual (of which they can have no more than a shadow) yet, as has been observed, men do not approve it because of any such analogy perceived.

And not only reason, but experience plainly shews, that mens approbation of this sort of beauty, does not spring from any virtuous temper, and has no connection with virtue. For otherwise mens delight in the beauty of squares, and cubes, and regular polygons
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in the regularity of buildings, and the beautiful figures in a piece of embroidery, would increase in proportion to mens virtue ; and would be raised to a great height in some eminently virtuous or holy men ; but would be almost wholly lost in some others who are very vicious and lewd. It is evident in fact, that a relish of these things does not depend on general benevolence, or any benevolence at all to any Being whatsoever, any more than a man's loving the taste of honey, or his being pleased with the smell of a rose. A taste of this inferior beauty in things immaterial, is one thing which has been mistaken by some moralists,

moralists, for a true virtuous principle, implanted naturally in the hearts of all mankind *.

C H A P. IV.

Of self-love, and its various influence to cause love to others, or the contrary.

MANY assert, that all love arises from self-love †. In order to deter-

* Particularly by the two ingenious, but mistaken Authors of the *Characteristicks*, and of the *Enquiry into our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*.

† HOBBS has done his utmost to shew us, that both in Religion and Morals we were imposed upon by our Governors; that there
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determine this point, it should be clearly determined what is meant by self-love.

Self-love, I think is generally defined—a man's love of his own happiness, which is short and may be thought very plain: but is indeed an ambiguous definition, as the pronoun, *his own*, is equivocal and liable to be taken in two very different senses. For a man's *own happiness*

is nothing which by nature inclines us either way; nothing which *naturally* draws us to the love of any thing without or beyond *Ourselves*. If, by Nature, he had meant our Nature as it is depraved and corrupted by the fall, which is hardly to be supposed, his observation had been too true: but upon no other principle will it admit of the least defence.

pinefs may either be taken universally, for all the happiness or pleasure which the mind is in any regard the subject of, or whatever is grateful and pleasing to men; or it may be taken for the pleasure a man expects in his own proper, private and separate good. And so *self-love* may be taken two ways :

1st, Self-love may be taken for the same as his loving whatsoever is grateful or pleasing to him. Which comes only to this, that *self-love* is a man's liking, and being suited and pleased in that which he likes, and which pleases him; or, that it is a man's loving what he loves. For, whatever a man loves, that thing is grateful and pleasing

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ing to him, whether that be his own peculiar happiness, or the happiness of others. And if this be all that they mean by self-love, no wonder they suppose that all love may be resolved into self-love. For it is undoubtedly true, that whatever a man loves, his love may be resolved into his loving what he loves—if that be proper speaking.—If by self-love is meant nothing else but a man's loving what is grateful or pleasing to him, and being averse to what is disagreeable, this is calling *that*, self-love, which is only a general capacity of loving and hating; or a capacity of being either pleased or displeased: which is the same thing as a man's having a faculty

culty of Will. For if nothing could be either pleasing or displeasing, agreeable or disagreeable to a man, then he could incline to nothing, and will nothing. But if he be capable of having inclination, will and choice, then what he inclines to and chuses, is grateful to him; whatever that be, whether it be his own private good, the good of his neighbours, or the glory of God. And so far as it is grateful or pleasing to him, so far it is a part of his pleasure, good or happiness.

But if this be what is meant by self-love, there is an impropriety and absurdity even in the putting of the question, “ Whether all our
“ love, or our love to each parti-

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“cular object of our love, does
 “not arise from self-love?” For
 that would be the same thing as to
 enquire, Whether the reason why
 our love is fixed on such and such
 particular objects, be not, that we
 have a capacity of loving some
 things? This may be a general rea-
 son why men love or hate any thing
 at all; and therein differ from stones
 and trees, which love nothing and
 hate nothing. But it can never be
 a reason why mens loves are placed
 on such and such objects. That a
 man in general loves and is pleas-
 ed with happiness, or (which is the
 same thing) has a capacity of en-
 joying happiness, cannot be the rea-
 son why such and such things be-
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come his happiness: as, for instance, why the good of his neighbour, or the happiness and glory of God, is grateful and pleasing to him, and so becomes a part of his happiness.

Or if what they mean, who say that all love comes from self-love, be not, that our loving such and such particular persons and things, arises from our love to happiness in general, but from a love to love our own happiness, which consists in these objects; so, the reason why we love benevolence to our friends, or neighbours, is, because we love our happiness, consisting in their happiness, which we take pleasure in:—still the notion is absurd. For here the effect is made the cause of

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that, of which it is the effect: our happiness, consisting in the happiness of the person beloved, is made the cause of our love to that person. Whereas, the truth plainly is that our love to the person is the cause of our delighting, or being happy in his happiness. How comes our happiness to consist in the happiness of such as we love, but by our hearts being first united to them in affection, so that we, as it were, look on them as ourselves, and so on their happiness as our own?

Men who have benevolence to others, have pleasure when they see others happy, because seeing their happiness gratifies some inclination that was in their hearts before.

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They before inclined to their happiness; which was by benevolence or good will; and therefore when they see them happy, their inclination is suited and they are pleased. But the Being of inclinations and appetites is prior to any pleasure in gratifying these appetites.

2. Self-love, as the phrase is used in common speech, most commonly signifies a man's regard to his confined *private-self*, or love to himself with respect to his *private Interest*.

By *private interest*, I mean, that which most immediately consists in those pleasures, or pains, which are *personal*. For there is a comfort, and a grief, that some have in others pleasures, or pains; which

are in others originally, but are derived to them, or in some measure become theirs, by virtue of a benevolent union of heart with others. And there are other pleasures and pains that are originally our own, and not what we have by such a participation with others. Which consist in perceptions agreeable, or contrary, to certain personal inclinations implanted in our nature; such as the sensitive appetites and aversions. Such also is the disposition or the determination of the mind to be pleased with external beauty, and with all inferior secondary beauty, consisting in uniformity, proportion, &c. whether in things external or internal, and
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to dislike the contrary deformity. Such also is the natural disposition in men to be pleased in a perception of their being the objects of the honor and love of others, and to be displeased with the hatred and contempt of others. For pleasures and uneasiness of this kind are doubtless as much owing to an immediate determination of the mind by a fixed law of nature, as any of the pleasures or pains of external sense. And these pleasures are properly of the private and personal kind; being not by any participation of the happiness or sorrow of others, through benevolence. It is evidently meer self-love, which appears in this disposition.

It is easy to see, that a man's love to himself will make him love love to himself, and hate hatred to himself. And, as GOD has constituted our nature, self-love is exercised in no one disposition more than this. Men, probably, are capable of much more pleasure and pain, through this determination of the mind, than by any other personal inclination or aversion, whatsoever. Though perhaps we do not so very often see instances of extreme suffering by these means, as by some others, yet we often see evidences of mens dreading the contempt of others more than death: and by such instances we may conceive, something of what men would suffer, if universally

fally hated and despised; and may reasonably infer something of the greatness of the misery, that would arise under a sense of universal abhorrence, in a great view of intelligent Being in general, or in a clear view of the deity, as incomprehensibly and immensely great, so that all other Beings are as nothing and vanity, — together with a sense of his immediate continual presence, and an infinite concern with him and dependence upon him,—and living constantly in the midst of most clear and strong evidences and manifestations of his hatred and contempt and wrath.

But to return,—These things may be sufficient to explain what I mean
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by private interest; in regard to which self-love, most properly so called, is immediately exercised.

And here I would observe, that if we take self-love in this sense, so love to some others may truly be the effect of self-love; namely, according to the common method and order, which is maintained in the laws of nature. For no created thing has power to produce an effect, any otherwise than by virtue of the laws of nature. Thus, that a man should love those who are of his party, when there are different parties contending one with another; and those who are warmly engaged on his side; and promote his interest,—this is the natural consequence

quence of a private self-love. Indeed there is no metaphysical necessity, in the nature of things, that because a man loves himself and regards his own interest, he therefore should love those that love him, and promote his interest; that is, to suppose it to be otherwise, implies no contradiction. It will not follow from any absolute metaphysical necessity, that because bodies have solidity, cohesion, and gravitation towards the centre of the earth, therefore a weight suspended on the beam of a balance should have greater power to counter-balance a weight on the other side, when at a distance from the fulcrum, than when it is near. It implies no contradiction

tradiction that it should be otherwise : but only as it contradicts that beautiful proportion and harmony, which the author of nature observes in the laws of nature he has established. Neither is there any absolute necessity, the contrary implying a contradiction, that, because there is an internal mutual attraction of the parts of the earth, or of any other sphere, whereby the whole becomes one solid coherent body, therefore our bodies that are around it, should also be attracted by it, and those that are nearest be attracted most. But according to the order and proportion generally observed in the laws of nature, one of these effects is connected with
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the other, so that it is justly looked upon as the same power of attraction in the globe of the earth, which draws bodies about the earth towards its centre, as that which attracts the parts of the earth themselves one to another; only exerted under different circumstances. By a like order of nature, a man's love to those that love him, is no more than a certain expression or effect of self-love. No other principle is needful in order to the effect, if nothing intervene to countervail the natural tendency of self-love. Therefore there is no more true Virtue in a man's thus loving his friends meerly from self-love, than there is in self-love itself, the principle

principle from whence it proceeds*.

So, a man's being disposed to hate those who hate him, or to resent injuries done him, arises from self-love in like manner as does the loving those who love us, and being thankful for kindness shewn us.

But it is said by some, that it is apparent, there is some other principle concerned in exciting the passions of gratitude and anger, besides self-

* " Let a man in any instance act ever so well, if at the bottom it be a selfish affection alone which moves him, he is in himself still *vicious*. And again, If that which restrains a person and holds him to a virtuous-like behaviour, be not affection towards Goodness and Virtue itself, but towards private good merely, he is not in reality *virtuous*."

Characteristicks.

self-love, namely, a moral sense, or sense of moral beauty and deformity, determining the minds of all mankind to approve of, and be pleased with virtue, and to disapprove of vice, and behold it with displeasure; and that their seeing or supposing this moral beauty or deformity, in the kindness of a benefactor, or opposition of an adversary, is the occasion of these affections of gratitude or anger. Otherwise why are not these affections excited in us towards inanimate things, that do us good or hurt? Why do not we experience gratitude to a garden or fruitful field? And why are we not angry with a tempest or blasting mildew, or an overflowing stream? We
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are very differently affected towards those who do us good from the virtue of generosity, or hurt us from the vice of envy and malice, than towards things that hurt or help us, which are destitute of Reason and Will. — Now concerning this, I would make several remarks.

1st, Those who thus argue, that gratitude and anger cannot proceed from self-love, might argue in the same way and with equal reason, that neither can these affections arise from love to others: which is contrary to their own scheme.

They say, that the reason why we are affected with gratitude and anger towards men, rather than things without life, is moral sense: which
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they say, is the effect of that principle of benevolence or love to others, or love to the public, which is natural in the hearts of all mankind *.—But now, I might say, according to their own way of arguing, that gratitude and anger cannot arise from love to others, or love to the public, or from any sense of mind that is the fruit of public affection. For how differently are we affected towards those who do good or hurt to the public, from understanding and will, and from a general public spirit, or public motive.—I say, how differently are we affected towards those, from

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* See HUTCHESON on Beauty and Virtue. KING's Origin of Evil. LOCKE on human Understanding: and Bp BUTLER's Analogy.

what we are towards such inanimate things, as the Sun and the clouds, which do good to the public, by enlightening and enlivening beams and refreshing showers; or mildew, and an overflowing stream, that does hurt to the public by destroying the fruits of the earth? Yea, if such a kind of argument be good, it will prove that gratitude and anger cannot arise from the united influence of self-love, and public love, or moral sense arising from public affection. For if so, why are we not affected towards inanimate things, that are beneficial or injurious both to us and the public, in the same manner as towards them who are profitable or hurtful to both from choice and design,

sign, and from benevolence or malice?

2. On the supposition of its being indeed so, that men love those who love them, and are angry with those who hate them, from the natural influence of self-love; it is not at all strange that the author of nature, who observes order, uniformity and harmony in establishing its laws, should so order, that it should be natural for self-love to cause the mind to be affected differently towards exceedingly different objects; and that it should cause our heart to extend itself in one manner towards inanimate things, which gratify self-love, without sense or will, and in another manner towards Beings which we look upon as hav-

ing, understanding and will, like ourselves, and exerting these faculties in our favour, and promoting our interest from love to us. No wonder, seeing we love ourselves, that it should be natural to us to extend something of that same kind of love which we have for ourselves, to them who are the same kind of Beings as ourselves, and who comply with the inclinations of our self-love, by expressing the same sort of love towards us.

3. If we should allow it to be universal, that in gratitude and anger there is the exercise of some kind of moral sense, (as it is granted there is something that may be so called) all the moral sense, that
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is essential to those affections, is a sense of DESERT *; which is to be referred to that sense of *justice*, before spoken of, consisting in an apprehension of that secondary kind of beauty, which lies in uniformity and proportion; which solves all the difficulty in the objection.—This, or some appearance of it, to a narrow private view, indeed attends all anger and gratitude.

The love and kindness of others to us, or their ill-will and injuriousness, appears to us to *deserve* our love, or our resentment. Or, in other words, it seems to us no other than *just*, that as they love us and

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* See SMITH'S Theory of moral Sentiments, p. 2.

do us good, we also should love them, and do them good. And so it seems *just*, that, when others hearts oppose us, and they from their hearts do us hurt, our hearts should oppose them, and that we should desire that they themselves, may suffer in like manner as we have suffered: that is, there appears to us to be a natural agreement proportion and adjustment, between these things; which is indeed a kind of moral sense, or sense of a beauty in moral things. But, as was before shewn, it is a moral sense of a *secondary* kind, and is entirely different from a sense or relish of the original essential beauty of true virtue; and may be without any principle of true virtue in the heart.

Doubtless

Doubtless therefore it is a great *mistake* in any to suppose, that all that moral sense, which appears, and is exercised, in a sense of *desert*, is the same thing as a love of virtue, or a disposition and determination of mind, to be pleased with true virtuous beauty, consisting in public benevolence: which may be farther confirmed, if it be considered that even with respect to a sense of *justice* or *desert*; consisting in uniformity (and agreement between others actions towards us, and our actions towards them, in a way of well-doing, or of ill-doing) it is not absolutely necessary to the being of these passions of gratitude and anger, that there should be any notion

of justice in them, in any public or general view of things; — as will appear by what shall be next observed.

4. Those authors*, who hold that that moral sense, which is natural to all mankind, consists in a natural relish of the beauty of Virtue, and so arises from a principle of true virtue implanted by nature in the hearts of all,—hold also that true virtue consists in *public benevolence*.

Therefore, if the affections of gratitude and anger necessarily imply such a moral sense as they suppose, then these affections imply some delight in the public good, and an aversion of the Mind to public

* LORD SHAFTESBURY, HUTCHESON, &c.

lic evil. And if this were so, then every time a man feels anger for opposition he meets with, or gratitude for any favor, there must be at least a supposition of a tendency to public injury in that opposition, and a tendency to public benefit in the favor that excites his gratitude. But how far is this from being true ! As in such instances as these, which, I presume, none will deny to be possible, or unlike to any thing that ever happens among mankind. A ship's crew enter into a conspiracy against the master, to murder him, and run away with the ship and turn pirates ; but before they bring their matters to a ripeness for execution,

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one of them repents, and opens the whole design; whereupon the rest are apprehended and brought to justice. The crew are enraged with him who has betrayed them, and earnestly seek opportunity to revenge themselves upon him.

And for an instance of gratitude, a gang of robbers that have long infested the neighbouring country, have a particular house whither they resort, and where they meet from time to time, to divide their booty or prey, and hold their consultations for carrying on their pernicious designs. The magistrates and officers of the country, after many fruitless endeavours to discover their secret haunt and place of resort, at length

length by some means are well informed where it is, and are prepared with sufficient force to surprize them, and seize them all, at the place of rendezvous, at an hour appointed, when they understand they will all be there. A little before the arrival of the appointed hour, while the officers with their bands are approaching, some person is so kind to these robbers, as to give them notice of their danger, so as just to give them opportunity to escape. They are thankful to him and give him a handful of money for his kindness.

Now, in such instances I think, it is plain, that there is no supposition of a public injury, in that
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which is the occasion of their *anger*; yea, they know the contrary. Nor is there any supposition of public good in that which excites their *gratitude*; neither has public benevolence, or moral sense, consisting in a determination to approve of what is for the public good, any influence at all in the affair. And though there be some affection, besides a sense of uniformity and proportion, that has influence in such anger and gratitude, it is not public affection or benevolence, but private affection; yea, that affection which is to the highest degree private, consisting in a man's love of his own person.

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5. The passion of *anger*, in particular, seems to have been unluckily chosen as a medium to prove a sense and determination to delight in virtue, consisting in benevolence, natural to all mankind.

For, if that moral sense, which is exercised in anger, were that which arose from a benevolent temper of heart, being no other than a sense or relish of the beauty of benevolence, one would think, a disposition to anger should increase, at least in some proportion, as a man had more of a sweet, benign and benevolent temper: which seems something disagreeable to reason, as well as contrary to experience, which shews that the less men have of benevolence,

nevolence, and the more they have of a contrary temper, the more are they disposed to anger and deep resentment of injuries.

And though *gratitude* be that which many speak of as a certain noble principle of virtue, which God has implanted in the hearts of all mankind; and though it be true that there is a gratitude, which is truly virtuous, and that the want of gratitude, or an ungrateful temper, is truly vicious, and argues an abominable depravity of heart (as I may have particular occasion to shew afterwards) yet, I think, what has been observed may serve to convince such as impartially consider it, not only that not all anger, or hating

ing those which hate us, but also that not all gratitude, or loving those which love us, arises from a truly virtuous benevolence of heart.

Another sort of affections, which may properly be referred to self-love, as its source, and which might be expected to be the fruit of it, according to the general analogy of nature's laws, is affection to such as are near to us by the ties of nature; that with which we look upon those whose Beings we have been the occasion of, and whom we have a very peculiar propriety in, and whose circumstances, even from the first beginning of their existence, do many ways lead them, as it were necessarily, to an high esteem of us,
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and to treat us with great dependence, submission and compliance; and whom the constitution of the world makes to be united in interest, and accordingly to act as one in innumerable affairs, with a communion in each others affections, desires, cares, friendships, enmities, and pursuits. Which is the case of mens affection to their children.— And in like manner self-love will also beget in a man some degree of affection towards others, with whom he has connection in any degree parallel.—As to the opinion of those who ascribe the natural affection there is between parents and children, to a particular *instinct* of nature,

nature, I shall take notice of it afterwards.

And as men may love persons and things from self-love, so may love to qualities and characters arise from the same source.

Some represent as though there were need of a great degree of metaphysical refining, to make it out, that men approve of others from self-love, whom they hear of at a distance, or read of in history, or see exhibited on the stage, from whom they expect no profit or advantage. But perhaps it is not considered, that what we approve of in the first place, is the character; and from the character we approve the person. And is it a strange thing, that

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men should from self-love like a temper or character, which in its nature and tendency falls in with the nature and tendency of self-love; and which we know by experience and self-evidence, without metaphysical refining, in the general tends to men's pleasure and benefit? And on the contrary, that they should dislike what they see tends to men's pain and misery? Is there need of a great degree of subtilty and abstraction, to make it out, that a child, which has heard and seen enough strongly to fix an Idea of the pernicious deadly nature of the rattle-snake, should have an aversion to that species or form, from self-love; so as to have a degree

gree of this aversion and disgust excited by seeing even the picture of that animal? And that from the same self-love it should be pleased and entertained with a lively figure and representation of some pleasant fruit, which it has often tasted the sweetness of? or, with the image of some bird, which, it has always been told, is innocent, and whose pleasant singing it has often been entertained with?—Though the child neither fears being bitten by the picture of the snake, nor expects to eat of the painted fruit, or to hear the figure of the bird sing. I suppose none will think it difficult to allow, that such an approbation or disgust of a child may be

accounted for from its natural delight in the pleasures of taste and hearing, and its aversion to pain and death, through self-love, together with the habitual connection of these agreeable or terrible Ideas with the form, and qualities of these objects, the ideas of which are impressed on the mind of the child by their images.

And where is the difficulty of allowing, that a child or man may hate the general character of a spiteful and malicious man, for the like reason as he hates the general nature of a serpent; knowing from reason, instruction and experience, that malice in men is pernicious to mankind, as well as spite or
poison

poison in a serpent? And if a man may from self-love disapprove the vices of malice, envy and others of that sort, which naturally tend to the hurt of mankind, why may he not from the same principle approve the contrary virtues of meekness, peaceableness, benevolence, charity, generosity, justice, and the social virtues in general; which, he as easily and clearly knows, naturally tend to the good of mankind?

It is undoubtedly true, that some have a love to these virtues from a higher principle. But yet I think it is as certainly true, that there is generally in mankind, a sort of approbation of them, which arises from self-love.

Besides what has been already said, the same thing further appears from this ; that men are commonly most affected towards, and do most highly approve, those virtues which agree with their interest most, according to their various conditions in life. We see that persons of low condition are especially enamoured with a condescending, accessible, affable temper in the great ; not only in those whose condescension has been exercised towards themselves ; but they will be peculiarly taken with such a character when they have accounts of it from others, or when they meet with it in history ; or even in romance. — The poor will most highly approve and commend

mend liberality.—The weaker sex, who especially need assistance and protection, will peculiarly esteem and applaud fortitude and generosity in those of the other sex, whom they read or hear of, or have represented to them on a stage.

As I think it plain from what has been observed, that men may approve, and be disposed to commend a benevolent temper, from self-love, so the higher the degree of benevolence is, the more may they approve of it. Which will account for some kind of approbation, from this principle, even of love to enemies; namely, that a man's loving his enemies, is an evidence of a high degree of benevolence of temper;—the de-

gree of it appearing from the obstacles it overcomes.

And it may be here observed, that the consideration of the tendency and influence of self-love may shew, how men in general may approve of *justice* from another ground, besides that approbation of the secondary beauty there is in uniformity and proportion, which is natural to all. Men from their infancy see the necessity of it, not only that it is necessary for others, or for human society; but they find the necessity of it for themselves, in instances that continually occur: which tends to prejudice them in its favour, and to fix an habitual approbation of it from self-love.

And

And again, that forementioned approbation of justice and desert, arising from a sense of the beauty of natural agreement and proportion, will have a kind of reflex, and indirect influence to cause men to approve benevolence, and disapprove malice; as men see that he, who hates and injures others, deserves to be hated and punished; and that he, who is benevolent and loves others, and does them good, deserves himself also to be loved and rewarded by others, as they see the natural congruity or agreement and mutual adaptedness of these things. And having always seen this, malevolence becomes habitually connected in the mind with
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the idea of being hated and punished, which is disagreeable to self-love; and the idea of benevolence is habitually connected and associated with the idea of being loved and rewarded by others, which is grateful to self-love. And by virtue of this association of ideas, benevolence itself becomes grateful, and the contrary displeasing.

Some vices may become in a degree odious by the influence of self-love, through an habitual connection of ideas of contempt with them; contempt being what self-love abhors. So it may often be with drunkenness, gluttony, sottishness, cowardice, sloth, niggardliness. — The idea of contempt becomes associated

ciated with the idea of such vices, both because we are used to observe that these things are commonly objects of contempt, and also find that they excite contempt in ourselves.—Some of them appear marks of littleness, that is, of small abilities, and weakness of mind, and insufficiency for any considerable effects among mankind.—By others, men's influence is contracted into a narrow sphere, and by such means persons become of less importance, and more insignificant among mankind. And things of little importance are naturally little accounted of.—And some of these ill qualities are such as mankind find it their interest to
treat

treat with contempt, as they are very hurtful to human society.

There are no particular moral virtues whatsoever, but what in some or other of these ways, and most of them in several of these ways, come to have some kind of approbation from self-love, without the influence of a truly virtuous principle; nor any particular vices, but what by the same means meet with some disapprobation.

This kind of approbation and dislike, through the joint influence of self-love and association of ideas, is in very many vastly heightened by education; as this is the means of a strong, close, and almost irrefragable association, in innumerable instances,

instances, of ideas which have no connection any other way than by education; and of greatly strengthening that association, or connection, which persons are led into by other means: as any one would be convinced, perhaps more effectually than in most other ways, if they had opportunity of any considerable acquaintance with *American* savages and their children.

C H A P. V.

Of natural conscience, and the moral sense.

THERE is yet another disposition or principle, of great importance, natural to mankind; which

which if we consider the consistence and harmony of nature's laws, may also be looked upon as in some sort arising from self-love, or self-union; and that is a disposition in man to be uneasy in a consciousness of being inconsistent with himself, and as it were, against himself, in his own actions. This appears particularly in the inclination of the mind to be uneasy in the consciousness of doing that to others, which he should be angry with them for doing to him, if they were in his case and he in theirs; or of forbearing to do that to them, which he would be displeased with them for neglecting to do to him.

I have observed from time to time, that, in pure love to others, (namely, love not arising from self-love) there is an union of the heart with others; a kind of enlargement of the mind, whereby it so extends itself as to take others into a man's self: and therefore it implies a disposition to feel, to desire and to act as though others were one with ourselves. So, self-love implies an inclination to feel and act as one with ourselves: which naturally renders a sensible inconsistency with ourselves, and self-opposition in what we ourselves chuse and do, to be uneasy to the mind: which will cause uneasiness of mind to be the consequence of

a malevolent and unjust behaviour towards others, and a kind of disapprobation of acts of this kind, and an approbation of the contrary. To do that to another, which we should be angry with him for doing to us, and to hate a person for doing that to us, which we should incline to and insist on doing to him, if we were exactly in the same case, is to disagree with ourselves, and contradict ourselves. It would be for ourselves both to chuse and adhere to, and yet to refuse and utterly reject, as it were the very same thing. No wonder this is contrary to nature. No wonder that such a self-opposition, and inward war with a man's self, naturally begets
unquiet-

unquietness, and raises disturbances in his mind.

A thus approving of actions, because we therein act as in agreement with ourselves, or as one with ourselves — and a thus disapproving and being uneasy in the consciousness of disagreeing and being inconsistent with ourselves in what we do — is quite a different thing from approving or disapproving actions, because in them we agree and are united with Being in general: which is loving or hating actions from a sense of the primary beauty of true virtue, and the odiousness of sin. — The former of these principles is private: the latter is public and truly benevolent in the highest sense. The

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former, (that is, an inclination to agree with ourselves) is a natural principle : but the latter, (that is, an agreement or union of heart to the great system, and to God, the head of it, who is all and all in it) is a divine principle.

In that uneasiness now mentioned, consists very much of that inward trouble men have from reflections of conscience: and when they are free from this uneasiness, and are conscious to themselves, that in what they have acted towards others, they have done the same which they should have expected from them in the same case, then they have what is called peace of conscience, with respect to these actions. And there

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is also an approbation of conscience of the conduct of others towards ourselves. As when we are blamed, condemned or punished by them, and are conscious to ourselves that, if we were in their case and they in ours, we should in like manner blame, condemn and punish them. And thus men's consciences may justify God's anger and condemnation. When they have the ideas of God's greatness, their relation to him, the benefits they have received from him, the manifestations he has made of his will to them, &c. strongly impressed on their minds, a consciousness is excited within them of those resentments, which would be occasioned in themselves

by an injurious treatment in any wise parallel*.

There is such a consciousness as this oftentimes within men, implied in the thoughts and views of the mind, which perhaps on reflection they could hardly, give an account of. Unless men's consciences are totally stupified, it is naturally and necessarily suggested; and does habitually, spontaneously, instantaneously, and as it were insensibly arise in the mind. And the more so for this reason, namely, that we have not, nor ever had from our infancy, any other way to conceive of any thing which other persons act or suffer, or any thing about intelligent, moral agents, but by recalling and exciting

* See SMITH'S Theory of moral Sentiments.

ing the ideas of what we ourselves are conscious of in the acts, passions, sensations, volitions, &c. which we have found in our own minds; and by putting the ideas which we obtain by these means, in the place of another; or as it were substituting ourselves in their place. Thus we have no conception, in any degree, what understanding, perception, love, pleasure, pain, or desire are in others, but by putting ourselves as it were in their stead, or transferring the ideas we obtain of such things in our own minds by consciousness, into their minds; making such an alteration, as to degree and circumstances, as what we observe of them requires. It is thus in all

moral things that we conceive of in others, which are all mental, and not corporeal things ; and in every thing that we conceive of, belonging to others, more than shape, size, complexion, situation and motion of their bodies. And this is the only way that we come to be capable of having ideas of any conception or act even of the Godhead. We never could have any notion what understanding or volition, love or hatred are either in created spirits or in God, if we had never experienced what understanding and volition, love and hatred are in our own minds. Knowing what they are by consciousness, we can add degrees, and deny limits, and remove changeableness

ness and other imperfections, and ascribe them to God. Which is the only way we come to be capable of conceiving of any thing in the Deity*.

But though it be so, that men in thinking of others, do as it were put themselves in their place, they do it so naturally or rather habitually, instantaneously, and without set purpose, that they do it insensibly, and can scarce give any account of it, and many would think it strange if they were told of it. So it may be in men's substituting themselves in the place of others in such exercises of conscience as have been spoken of; and the former substitution leads to the latter, in one whose consci-

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* See LOCKE in his Essay on human Understanding. Vol. 2.

ence is not greatly stupified. For in all his thoughts of the other person, in whatever he apprehends or conceives of his moral conduct to others or to himself, if it be in loving or hating him, approving or condemning him, rewarding or punishing him, he necessarily as it were puts himself in his stead, for the forementioned reason; and therefore the more naturally, easily and quietly sees whether he, being in his place, should approve or condemn, be angry or pleased as he is*.

Natural

* May we not upon this principle, account for the sudden and remarkable acts of generosity and compassion which sometimes appear in the character of the most vicious; that is, of such as are the greatest strangers to

Natural conscience consists in these two things,

1st, In that which has now been spoken of: that disposition to approve or disapprove the moral treatment which passes between us and others, from a determination of the mind to be easy, or uneasy, in a consciousness of our being consistent, or inconsistent with ourselves. Hereby we have a disposition to approve our own treatment of another, when we are conscious to ourselves that we treat him so as we should expect to be treated by him, were he in our case and we in his; and to disapprove of our own treatment of another,

to true Virtue, or love of primary, moral beauty?

ther, when we are conscious that we should be displeased with the like treatment from him, if we were in his case. So we in our consciences approve of another's treatment of us, if we be conscious to ourselves, that if we were in his case and he in ours, we should think it just to treat him as he treats us ; and disapprove his treatment of us, when we are conscious that we should think it unjust, if we were in his case. Thus mens consciences approve or disapprove the sentence of their judge, by which they are acquitted or condemned*.

But this is not all that is in natural conscience. Besides this approving or disapproving from uneasiness

* See some valuable remarks upon this subject in Bp BUTLER's Sermons, 8vo. p.25.

easiness as being inconsistent with ourselves, there is another thing that must precede it and be the foundation of it. As for instance; when my conscience disapproves my own treatment of another, being conscious to myself, that were I in his case, I should be displeased and angry with him for so treating me, the question might be asked, but what would be the *ground* of that supposed disapprobation, displeasure and anger, which I am conscious would be in me in that case?— That disapprobation must be on some other grounds.

Therefore,

2dly, The other thing which belongs to the approbation or disapprobation

probation of natural conscience, is the sense of desert, which was spoken of before ; consisting as was observed, in a natural agreement, proportion, and harmony, between malevolence or injury, and resentment and punishment, or between loving and being loved, between shewing kindness and being rewarded, &c. Both these kinds of approving or disapproving concur in the approbation or disapprobation of conscience : the one founded on the other. Thus when a man's conscience disapproves of his treatment of his neighbour, in the first place he is conscious that if he were in his neighbour's stead, he should resent such treatment, from a sense of justice,

tice, or from a sense of uniformity and equality between such treatment and resentment and punishment; as before explained. And then in the next place he perceives, that therefore he is not consistent with himself, in doing what he himself should resent in that case; and hence disapproves it, as being naturally averse to opposition to himself.

Approbation and disapprobation of conscience, in the sense now explained, will extend to all virtue and vice; to every thing whatsoever that is morally good or evil, in a mind which does not confine its view to a private sphere, but will take things in general into its consideration,

sideration, and is free from speculative error. For as all virtue or moral good may be resolved into love to others, either God or creatures, so men easily see the uniformity and natural agreement there is between loving others, and being accepted and favoured by others. And all vice, sin or moral evil summarily consisting in the want of this love to others, or in the contrary, namely, hatred or malevolence *,
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* In the *defect*, observe, of positive good affections, as well as in the exercise of evil affections.—And this may serve to reconcile us more than any thing to the justice of that eternal punishment which is denounced against *Sin*; because its very *Nature*, and its *Tendency* is to oppose the good of *universal being*. It is the very reverse of *true Virtue*, as here explained.

men easily see the natural agreement there is between hating and doing ill to others, and being hated by them and suffering ill from them, or from Him who acts for all and has the care of the whole system.

And as this sense of equality and natural agreement extends to all moral good and evil, so this lays a foundation of an equal extent with the other kind of approbation and disapprobation, which is grounded upon it, arising from an aversion to self - inconsistency and opposition. For in all cases of benevolence or the contrary towards others, we are capable of putting ourselves in the place of others, and are naturally
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led to do it, and so of reflecting, and being conscious to ourselves, how we should like or dislike such treatment from others. Thus natural conscience, if the understanding be properly enlightened, and errors and blinding stupifying prejudices are removed, concurs with the law of God, and is of equal extent with it, and joins its voice with it in every article. And thus, in particular, we may see in what respect this natural conscience, which has been described, extends to true virtue, consisting in union of heart to Being in general, and in supreme love to God. For, although it sees not, or rather does not taste its primary and essential beauty, that is, it tastes

no sweetness in benevolence to Being in general, simply considered, or loves it not for Being in general's sake (for nothing but general benevolence itself can do that) yet this natural conscience, common to mankind, may approve of it from that uniformity, equality and justice, which there is in it, and the demerit which is seen in the contrary, consisting in the mutual agreement between the contrary and being hated of Being in general.

Men by natural conscience may see the justice (or natural agreement) there is in yielding all to God, as we receive all from God; and the justice there is in being his who has made us, and in being

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willingly so; which is the same as being dependent on his will, and conformed to his will in the manner of our Being, as we are for our Being itself, and in the conformity of our will to his will, on whose will we are universally and most perfectly dependent; and also the justice there is in our supreme love to God, from his goodness,—the natural agreement there is between our having supreme respect to him who exercises infinite goodness to us, and from whom we receive all well-being. Besides that disagreement and discord appears worse to natural sense, (as was observed before) in things nearly related and of great importance, and therefore it must

must appear very ill, as it respects the infinite Being, and in that infinitely great relation which there is between the great Creator and his creatures. And it is easy to conceive how that natural sense, which is in natural conscience, should see the desert of punishment, which there is in the contrary of true virtue, namely, opposition and enmity to Being in general. For this is only to see the natural agreement there is between opposing Being in general, and being opposed by Being in general; with a consciousness that if we were infinitely great, we should expect to be regarded according to our great-

ness, and should proportionably resent contempt *.

Thus

* Thus natural Conscience will tell a man that God is the moral Governor of the World—that all Government implies a Law, either expressed or understood—that the transgression of that Law, whether natural or revealed, is Sin—that sin implies a desert of punishment—that every sin or fault deserves a greater or less punishment, in proportion as the crime or fault is greater or less—that a Crime is more or less heinous according as we are under greater or less obligation to the contrary—that our obligation to love, honour, and obey any Being or Beings is in proportion to his or their loveliness, honourableness and authority—that God is a Being infinitely lovely, because he hath infinite excellence and beauty; infinitely honourable, because he has infinite greatness, majesty, and glory; and his authority over
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Thus natural conscience, if well informed, will approve of true virtue, and will disapprove and condemn the want of it, and opposition to it; and yet without seeing the true beauty of it. Yea, if men's consciences were fully enlightened, if they were delivered from being confined to a private sphere, and brought to view and consider things in general, and delivered from being stupified by sensual objects and appetites, as they will be at the day

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us is infinite, for he is infinitely worthy to be obeyed in himself, and we have an absolute, universal, and infinite dependence upon him—and that sin against God, being a violation of infinite obligations, must be a Crime infinitely heinous, and therefore deserving of infinite punishment.

of judgment, they would approve nothing but true virtue, nothing but general benevolence, and those affections and actions that are consistent with it and subordinate to it. For they must see that consent to Being in general, and supreme respect to the Being of Beings, is most just: and that every thing which is inconsistent with it, and interferes with it, or flows from the want of it, is unjust, and deserves the opposition of universal existence*.

Thus

* Hence the reason and equity of the two great commands of the moral Law—hence the immutability of that Law—hence the absurdity of a new, remedial Law—and hence the necessity of a Lawfulfiller, in such a Nature and of such a Character, as that in which the Mediator is exhibited to us in the sacred writings.

Thus has GOD established and ordered, that this principle of natural conscience, which though it implies no such thing as actual benevolence to Being in general, nor any delight in such a principle, simply considered, and so implies no truly spiritual sense, or virtuous taste, yet should approve and condemn the same things as are approved and condemned by a spiritual sense or virtuous taste.

That *moral sense* which is natural to mankind, so far as it is disinterested, and not founded in association of ideas, is the same with this natural conscience that has been described. The sense of moral good and evil, and that disposition

to approve virtue, and disapprove vice, which men have by natural conscience, is that moral sense, so much insisted on in the writings of many of late; a misunderstanding of which seems to have been the thing that has misled those moralists who have insisted on a disinterested moral sense, universal in the world of mankind, as an evidence of a disposition to true virtue, consisting in a benevolent temper, naturally implanted in the minds of all men. Some of the arguments made use of by these writers do indeed prove that there is a moral sense or taste, universal among men, distinct from what arises from self-love. Though I humbly conceive

ceive that there is some confusion in their discourses on the subject, and not a proper distinction observed in the instances of men's approbation of virtue, which they produce. Some of which are not to their purpose, being instances of that approbation of virtue, which has been described, and which arises from self-love. But other instances prove that there is a moral taste, or sense of moral good and evil, natural to all, which does not properly arise from self-love. Yet I conceive there are no instances of this kind which may not be referred to natural conscience, and particularly to that which I have observed to be primary in the approbation of natural conscience,

ence, namely, a sense of desert and approbation of that natural agreement there is, in manner and measure, in justice. But I think it is plain from what has been said, that neither this, nor any thing else, wherein consists the sense of moral good and evil, which there is in natural conscience, is of the nature of a truly virtuous taste, or determination of mind to relish and delight in the essential beauty of true virtue, arising from a virtuous benevolence of heart.

But it further appears from this — If the approbation of the conscience were the same with the approbation of the inclination of the heart, or the natural disposition and deter-

determination of the mind, to love and be pleased with virtue, then approbation and condemnation of conscience would always be in proportion to the virtuous temper of the mind, or rather, the degree would be just the same. In that person, who had a high degree of a virtuous temper, therefore, the testimony of conscience in favour of virtue would be equally full. But he, who had but little, would have as little a degree of the testimony of conscience for virtue, and against vice. But I think the case is evidently otherwise. Some men, through the strength of vice in their hearts, will go on in sin against clearer light and stronger convictions

tions of conscience, than others. If conscience's approving duty and disapproving sin be the same thing as the exercise of a virtuous principle of the heart, in loving duty and hating sin, then remorse of conscience will be the same thing as repentance : and just in the same degree as the sinner feels remorse of conscience for sin, in the same degree is his heart turned from the love of sin to the hatred of it, inasmuch as they are the very same thing.

Christians have the greatest reason to believe, from the scriptures, that, in the future day of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God, when sinners shall be called

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ed to answer before their judge, and all their wickedness, in all its aggravations shall be brought forth, and clearly manifested in the perfect light of that day, and God shall reprove them, and set their sins in order before them, their consciences will be greatly awakened and convinced; their mouths will be stopped; all stupidity of conscience will be at an end, and conscience will have its full exercise: and therefore their consciences will approve the dreadful sentence of the judge against them, and, seeing that they have deserved so great a punishment, will join with the judge in condemning them. And this, according to the notion I am opposing,

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ing, would be the same thing as their being brought to the fullest repentance; their hearts being perfectly changed to hate sin and love holiness; and virtue or holiness of heart in them being brought to the most full and perfect exercise.

But how much otherwise, have we reason to suppose it will then be! namely, That the sin and wickedness of their heart will then come to its highest dominion and compleatest exercise; that they will be wholly left of God, and given up to their wickedness, even as the devils are! When God has done waiting on sinners, and his Spirit is done striving with them, he will not restrain their wickedness, as he does
now.

now. But sin will then rage in their hearts, as a fire no longer restrained or kept under. It is proper for a judge when he condemns a criminal, to endeavour so to set his guilt before him as to convince his conscience of the justice of the sentence. This the Almighty will do effectually, and do to perfection, so as more thoroughly to awaken and convince the conscience. But if natural conscience, and the disposition of the heart to be pleased with virtue, were the same, then, at the same time that the conscience was brought to its perfect exercise, the heart would be made perfectly holy; or, would have the exercise of true virtue and holiness in perfect

fect benevolence of temper. But instead of this their wickedness will then be brought to perfection, and wicked men will become very devils, and accordingly will be sent away, as cursed, into everlasting fire prepared for the Devil and his Angels.

But supposing natural conscience to be what has been described, all these difficulties and absurdities are wholly avoided. Sinners, when they see the greatness of the Being, whom they have lived in contempt of, and in rebellion and opposition to, and when their obligations to him, as their creator, preserver, benefactor, &c. are clearly set before them, together with the degree in which

which they have acted as enemies to him, may have a clearer sense of the *desert* of their sin, consisting in the natural agreement there is between such contempt of and opposition to such a Being, and his despising and opposing them; between their being and acting as so great enemies to such a God, and their suffering the dreadful consequences of his being and acting as their great enemy: and their being conscious within themselves of the degree of anger, which would naturally arise in their own hearts, in such a case, if they were in the place and state of their Judge. In order to these things there is no need of a virtuous benevolent temper, relishing and
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delighting in benevolence, and loathing the contrary. The conscience may see the natural agreement between opposition and being opposed, between hating and being hated, without abhorring malevolence from a benevolent temper of mind, or without loving God from a view of the beauty of his holiness. These things have no necessary dependence on each other.

C H A P. V.

Of particular instincts of nature, which in some respects resemble virtue.

THERE are various dispositions and inclinations natural
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to men, which depend on particular laws of nature, determining their minds to certain affections and actions towards particular objects; which laws seem to be established chiefly for the preservation of mankind, though not only for this, but also for their comfortably subsisting in the world. Which dispositions may be called *instincts* *.

Some of these instincts respect only ourselves personally: such are many of our natural appetites and aversions. Some of them are not wholly personal, but more social,
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* See HUTCHESON, on the Passions and Affections; and on Beauty and Virtue, Sect 5. p. 195. SMITH's Theory of moral Sentiments, p. 1. c. 1. and Bp BUTLER's Sermon on Compassion.

and extend to others : such are the mutual inclinations between the sexes, &c.—Some of these dispositions are more external and sensitive ; such as some of our natural inclinations which are personal ; as those that relate to meat and drink. And of this sort also, are some dispositions that are more social, and in some respects extend to others ; as the more sensitive inclinations of the sexes towards each other. Besides these instincts of the sensitive kind, there are others that are more internal and mental : consisting in affections of the mind, which mankind naturally exercise towards some of their fellow-creatures, or in some cases towards men
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in general. Some of these instincts, which are mental and social, are what may be called kind affections; as having something in them of benevolence, or a resemblance of it. And others are of a different sort, having something in them that carries an angry appearance; such as the passion of jealousy between the sexes, especially in the male towards the female.

It is only the nature of these two last mentioned sorts, that it is to my purpose to consider in this place, namely, those natural instincts which appear in benevolent affections, or which have the appearance of benevolence; and so in some respects resemble virtue. These I

shall therefore consider, and shall endeavour to shew that none of them can be of the nature of true virtue.

That kind of affection which is exercised towards those who are near to one another in natural relation, particularly the love of parents to their children, called natural affection, is by many referred to instinct. I have already considered this sort of love as an affection which arises from self-love; and in that view, and in that supposition have shewn that it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. But if any think, that natural affection is more properly to be referred to a particular instinct of nature, than
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to self-love, as its cause, I shall not think it a point worthy of any controversy or dispute. In my opinion both are true; namely, that natural affection is owing to natural instinct, and also that it arises from self-love. It may be said to arise from instinct, as it depends on a law of nature. But yet it may be truly reckoned as an affection arising from self-love; because, though it arises from a law of nature, yet that is such a law as, according to the order and harmony every where observed amongst the laws of nature, is connected with, and follows from self-love: as was shewn before.

However, it is not necessary to my present purpose, to insist on this.

For if it be so, that natural affection to a man's children or family, or near relations, is not properly to be ascribed to self-love, as its cause in any respect, but is to be esteemed an affection arising from a particular independent instinct of nature, which the creator in his wisdom has implanted in men for the preservation and well-being of the world of mankind, yet it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. For it has been observed, and I humbly conceive, proved before, (chap. II.) that if any Being or Beings have by natural instinct, or any other means, a determination of mind to benevolence, extending only to some particular persons or
private

private system, however large that system may be, or however great a number of individuals it may contain, so long as it contains but an infinitely small part of universal existence, and so bears no proportion to this great and universal system,—such limited private benevolence, not arising from, nor being subordinate to, benevolence to Being in general, cannot have the nature of true virtue.

It may not be amiss however briefly to observe now, that it is evident to a demonstration, that those affections cannot be of the nature of true virtue, from these two considerations.

1st, That

1st, That they do not arise from a principle of virtue.—A principle of virtue, I think, is owned by the most considerable of late writers on morality to be general Benevolence or public affection: and I think it has been proved to be union of heart to Being simply considered; which implies a disposition to Benevolence to Being in general. Now, by the supposition, the affections we are speaking of do not arise from this principle; and that, whether we suppose they arise from *self-love*; or from *particular instincts*: because either of those sources is diverse from a principle of general benevolence. And,

2^{dly},

2dly, These private affections, if they do not arise from general benevolence, and if they be not connected with it in their first existence, have no tendency to produce it. This appears from what has been observed: for being not dependent on it, their detached and subordinate operation rather tends to and implies opposition to Being in general, than general benevolence, as every one sees and owns with respect to self-love. And there are the very same reasons why any other private affection, confined to limits infinitely short of universal existence, should have that influence, as well as love that is confined to a single person.—Upon the whole
then,

then, nothing can be plainer than that affections which do not arise from a virtuous principle, and have no tendency to true virtue, as their effect, cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

For the reasons which have been given, it is undeniably true, that if persons by any means come to have a benevolent affection limited to a party that is very large; or to the country or nation in general, of which they are a part; or to the public community they belong to, though it be as large as the Roman empire was of old; yea, if there could be an instinct or other cause determining a person to benevolence

lence towards the whole world of mankind, or even all created sensible creatures throughout the universe, exclusive of union of heart to general existence and of love to God, and not derived from that temper of mind which disposes to a supreme regard to him, nor subordinate to such divine love, it cannot be of the nature of true virtue *.

If what is called natural affection, arise from a particular natural instinct, so, much more indisputably, does that mutual affection which naturally arises between the sexes. I agree with *Hutcheson* and *Hume* in this,

* See Bp BUTLER's excellent Sermon on the love of God.

this, that there is a foundation laid in nature for kind affections between the sexes, which are truly diverse from all inclinations to sensitive pleasure, and do not properly arise from any such inclination. There is doubtless a disposition both to a mutual benevolence and mutual complacence, which is not naturally and necessarily connected with any sensitive desires. But yet it is manifest that such affections as are limited to opposite sexes, are from a particular instinct, thus directing and limiting them; and not arising from a principle of general benevolence: for this has no tendency to any such limitation. And though these affections do not properly arise from
from

from the sensitive desires which are between the sexes, yet they are implanted by the author of nature chiefly for the same purpose, namely, the preservation or continuation of the world of mankind; to make persons willing to forsake father and mother, and all their natural relations in the families where they were born and brought up, for the sake of a stated union with a companion of the other sex; and to dispose to that union in bearing and going through with that series of labours, anxieties and pains requisite to the being, support and education of a family of children. Though not only for these ends, but partly also for the comfort of
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mankind as united in a marriage-relation.—But I suppose, few (if any) will deny that the peculiar natural dispositions there are to mutual affection between the sexes arise from an instinct or particular law of nature. And therefore it is manifest from what has been said already, that those natural dispositions cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

Another affection which is owing to a particular instinct, implanted in men for like purposes with other instincts, is that Pity which is natural to mankind, when they see others in great distress. It is acknowledged that such an affection is natural to mankind. But I think
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it evident that the pity which is general and natural, is owing to a particular instinct, and is not of the nature of true virtue. I am far from saying that there is no such thing as a truly virtuous pity amongst mankind ; for I am far from thinking, that all the pity or mercy which is any where to be found among them, arises merely from natural instinct; or, that none is to be found, which arises from a truly virtuous divine principle of general benevolence to sensitive Beings. Yet, at the same time, I think that this is not the case with all pity, or with that disposition to pity which is natural to mankind in common. I think I may be bold to say that this

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does not arise from general benevolence, nor is it truly of the nature of benevolence, or properly called by that name.

If all that uneasiness on the sight of others extreme distress, which we call pity, were properly of the nature of benevolence, then they, who are the subjects of this passion, must needs be in a degree of uneasiness in being sensible of the total want of happiness of all such as they would be disposed to pity in extreme distress. For that certainly is the most direct tendency and operation of benevolence or good-will, namely, to desire the happiness of its object. But now this is not the case universally, where men are disposed

ed to exercise pity. There are many men, with whom, in respect to some others in the world, it would not be the occasion of their being sensibly affected with any uneasiness, to know they were dead" (yea, men who are not influenced by the consideration of a future state, but view death as a cessation of all sensibility, and consequently an end of all happiness) who yet would have been moved to pity towards the same persons, if they had seen them under some very extreme anguish.— Some men would be moved with pity by seeing a brute creature under extreme and long torment, who yet suffer no uneasiness in knowing that many thousands of them every

day cease to live, and so have an end put to all their pleasure, at butchers shambles in great cities.— It is the nature of true benevolence to desire and rejoice in the prosperity and pleasure of the object of it, and that, in some proportion to its degree of prevalence. But persons may greatly pity those who are in extreme pain, whose positive pleasure they may still be very indifferent about. In this case, a man may be much moved and affected with uneasiness, who yet would be affected with no sensible joy in seeing signs of the same person's or Being's enjoyment of very high degrees of pleasure *.

* This consideration may serve to solve a great difficulty by which the mind is often
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Yea, pity may not only be without benevolence, but may consist with true malevolence, or with such ill-will as shall cause men not only not to desire the positive happiness of another, but even to desire his calamity. They may pity such an one when his calamity goes beyond their hatred. A man may have true ma-

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puzzled in forming its judgment of certain specious Characters in the world, in which there appears much tenderness and amiable pity towards objects in distress; whose positive pleasure and real happiness, they nevertheless disregard. If such characters were influenced by a principle of *true Virtue*, as well as this natural instinct of Pity, they would no doubt be equally concerned about the positive, real, greatest and eternal good of such Objects: which is not always, or rather, but seldom the case.

levolence towards another, desiring no positive good towards him, but evil : and yet his hatred may not be infinite, but only to a certain degree. And when he sees the person, whom he thus hates, in misery far beyond his ill-will, he may then pity him : because then the natural instinct begins to operate. For malevolence will not overcome the natural instinct inclining to pity others in extreme calamity, or when it exceeds the limits of the degree of misery it wishes to its object. Men may pity others under exquisite torment ; when yet they would have been grieved if they had seen their prosperity. And some men have such a grudge against one
another,

another, that they would be far from being uneasy at their very death, nay, would even be glad of it. And when this is the case with them, it is manifest that their heart is void of benevolence towards such persons, and that it is under the power of malevolence. Yet, at the same time they are capable of pitying even these very persons, if they should see them under a degree of misery very much disproportioned to their ill-will.

These things may convince us that natural pity is a thing very different from true virtue, and not arising from a disposition of heart to general benevolence ; but is owing to a particular instinct, which

the Creator has implanted in mankind, for the same purposes as most other instincts, namely, chiefly for the preservation of mankind, though not exclusive of their well-being. The giving of this instinct is the fruit of God's mercy, and an instance of his love of the world of mankind, and an evidence that, tho' the world be so sinful, it is not God's design to make it a world of punishment; and therefore He has in many ways made a merciful provision for their relief in extreme calamities: and among others has given mankind in general a disposition to pity; the natural exercises whereof extend beyond those whom we are in a near connection with, especially

ally in cases of great calamity; because commonly in such cases men stand in need of the help of others beside their near friends; and because commonly those calamities which are extreme, without relief, tend to their destruction. This may be given as the reason why men are so made by the author of nature, that they have no instinct inclining as much to rejoice at the sight of others great prosperity and pleasure, as to be grieved at their extreme calamity, namely, because they do not stand in equal necessity of such an instinct, as that, in order to their preservation. But if pure benevolence were the source of natural pity, doubtless it would operate

rate to as great a degree in congratulation, in cases of others great prosperity, as in compassion towards them in great misery.

The instincts God has given to mankind in this world, which in some respects resemble a virtuous benevolence, are agreeable to the state that God designed mankind for here, where he intends their preservation, and comfortable subsistence. But in the world of punishment, where the state of the wicked inhabitants will be exceedingly different, and God will have none of these merciful designs to answer, there, we have great reason to think, will be no such thing as a disposition to pity, in any case; as also there

there will be no natural affection toward near relations, and no mutual affection between opposite sexes.

To conclude what I have to say on the *natural instinct* disposing men to pity others in misery, I would observe, that this is a source of a kind of abhorrence in men of some vices, as cruelty and oppression; and so, of a sort of approbation of the contrary virtues, humanity, mercy, &c. Which aversion and approbation, however, so far as they arise from this cause only, are not from a principle of true virtue.

C H A P. VII.

The reasons why those things that have been mentioned, which have not the Essence of Virtue, have yet by many been mistaken for true virtue.*

THE first reason which may be given of this, is, that although they have not the specific and distinguishing nature and essence of virtue, yet they have something that *belongs to the general nature* of virtue.—The general nature of true virtue is Love. It is expressed both in love of benevolence and of complacence; but primarily in benevolence to persons and Beings, and
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* Such as natural Affections, public Affection, Pity, &c. &c.

consequently and secondarily in complacency in virtue,—as has been shewn. There is something of the general nature of virtue in those natural affections and principles that have been mentioned, in both these respects.

In many of these *natural affections* there is something of the appearance of love to persons. In some of them there appears the tendency and effect of benevolence in part. Others have truly a sort of benevolence in them, though it be a private benevolence, and in several respects falls short of the extent of true virtuous benevolence, both in its nature and object.

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The last mentioned passion, natural to mankind in their present state, namely, that of *pity* to others in distress, though not properly of the nature of love, as has been demonstrated, yet has partly the same influence and effect as benevolence. One effect of true benevolence is to cause persons to be uneasy, when the objects of it are in distress, and to desire their relief. And natural pity has the same effect.

Natural *gratitude*, though in every instance wherein it appears it is not properly called love, because persons may be moved with a degree of gratitude towards persons on certain occasions, whom they have no real and proper friendship for, as in
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the instance of *Saul* towards *David*, once and again, after *David's* sparing his life, when he had so fair an opportunity to kill him : yet it has the same or like operation and effect as friendship, in part, for a season, and with regard to so much of the welfare of its object, as appears a deserved requital of kindness received. And in other instances it may have a more general and abiding influence, so as more properly to be called by the name of love. So that many times men from natural gratitude do really with a sort of benevolence love those who love them. From this, together with some other natural principles, men may love their near friends,

friends, love their own party, love their country, &c.

The natural disposition there is to mutual affection between the sexes often operates by what may be called love. There is oftentimes truly a kind both of benevolence and of complacence. As there is also between parents and children.

Thus these things have something of the general nature of virtue, which is love: and especially the thing last mentioned has something of a love of benevolence. What they are essentially defective in, is, that they are private in their nature; they do not arise from any temper of benevolence to Being in general; nor have they a tendency
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to any such effect in their operation. But yet agreeing with virtue in its general nature, they are beautiful within their own private sphere: that is, they appear beautiful if we confine our views to that private system, and while we shut all other things they stand in any relation to out of our consideration. If that private system contained the sum of universal existence, then their benevolence would have true beauty; or, in other words would be beautiful, all things considered: but now it is not so. These private systems are so far from containing the sum of universal Being, or from comprehending all existence which we stand related to, that they con-

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tain but an infinitely small part of it.

The reason why men are so ready to take these private affections for true virtue, is the narrowness of their views; and above all, that they are so ready to leave the divine Being out of their view, and to neglect him in their consideration, or to regard him in their thoughts as tho' he were not properly belonging to the system of real existence, but as a kind of shadowy, imaginary Being. And though men allow there is a God, yet in their ordinary views of things, his Being is not apt to come into the account and to have the influence and effect of a real existence, as it is with other Beings, which they see, and are conversant with

with by their external senses. In their views of beauty and deformity, and in the inward sensations of displacence and approbation which arise in their minds, it is not a thing natural to them to be under the influence of a view of the Deity, as a part of the system and as the Head of the system, and He, who is all in all; in comparison of whom all the rest is *nothing*; and, with regard to whom, all other things are to be viewed, and their minds to be accordingly impressed and affected.

Yea, we are apt, through the narrowness of our views, in judging of the beauty of affections and actions, to limit our consideration to a small part only of the created system.

When private affections extend themselves to a considerable number, we are very ready to look upon them as truly virtuous, and accordingly to applaud them highly. Thus it is with respect to love to a large party, or a man's love to his country. For though his private system contains but a small part even of the world of mankind, yet being a considerable number, through the contracted limits of the mind, and the narrowness of his views, they are ready to fill his mind and engross his sight, and to seem as if they were all. Hence, amongst the *Romans*, love to their country was the highest virtue: though this affection of theirs, so much extolled amongst them,

them, was employed as it were for the destruction of the rest of the world of mankind.—The larger the number is, which that private affection extends to, the more apt men are, through the narrowness of their sight, to mistake it for true virtue; because then the private system appears to have more of the image of the universal system. Whereas, when the circle it extends to is very small, it is not so apt to be looked upon as virtuous; or at least not so virtuous. As, a man's love to his own children, for instance.

And this is the reason why self-love is by nobody mistaken for true virtue. For, though there be something of the general nature of virtue

in this, as love and good-will, yet the object is so private, the limits so narrow, that they by no means engross the view; unless it be of the person himself, who through the greatness of his pride may imagine himself as it were *all*. The minds of men are large enough to take in a vastly greater extent; and though self-love is far from being useless in the world, yea it is exceeding necessary to society, besides its directly and greatly seeking the good of one; yet every body sees that, if it be not subordinate to, and regulated by, another more extensive principle, it may make a man a common enemy to the system he is related to. And though this is as true of any other private affection, notwithstanding
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its extent may be to a system that contains thousands of individuals, as those private systems bear no greater proportion to the whole of universal existence, than one alone; yet they bear a greater proportion to the views and comprehensions of men's minds, and are more apt to be regarded as if they were *all*; or, at least, as some resemblance of the universal system.

Thus I have observed, how many of those natural principles, which have been spoken of, resemble virtue in its primary operation, which is benevolence. Many of them also have a resemblance of it in its secondary operation, which is its approbation of and complacence in

virtue itself. Several kinds of approbation of virtue have been taken notice of, as common to mankind, which are not of the nature of a truly virtuous approbation, consisting in a sense and relish of the essential beauty of virtue; which consists in a Being's cordial union to Being in general. As particularly, the approbation of conscience, from a sense of the inferior and secondary beauty which there is in virtue, consisting in uniformity and from a sense of desert; consisting in a sense of the natural agreement of loving and being beloved, shewing kindness and receiving kindness. So from the same principle, there is a dis-

disapprobation of vice, from a natural opposition to deformity and disproportion, and a sense of evil desert, or the natural agreement there is between hating and being hated, opposing and being opposed, &c. together with a painful sensation naturally arising in a sense of self-opposition and inconsistency.

Approbation of conscience is the more readily mistaken for a truly virtuous approbation, because by the wise constitution of the great Governor of the world (as was observed) when conscience is well informed, and thoroughly awakened, it agrees with the latter fully and exactly, as to the object approved,
though

though not as to the ground and reason of approving. It approves all virtue and condemns all vice. It approves true virtue ; and indeed approves nothing that is against it, or that falls short of it; as was shewn before. And indeed natural conscience is implanted in all mankind, there to be as it were in God's stead, and to be an internal judge or rule to all, whereby to distinguish right and wrong*.

It has also been observed, how that virtue, consisting in benevolence, is approved, and vice, consisting in ill-will, is disliked from the influence of self-love, together with association of ideas; in the
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* See Bp BUTLER's Sermon, p. 25—45.

same manner as men dislike those qualities in things without life or reason, with which they have always connected the ideas of hurtfulness, malignancy, perniciousness; but like those things with which they habitually connect the ideas of profit, pleasantness, comfortableness, &c. This sort of approbation or liking of virtue, and dislike of vice, is easily mistaken for true virtue, not only because those things are approved by it that have the nature of virtue, and the things disliked have the nature of vice, but because here is much of resemblance of virtuous approbation, it being complacence from love; the difference only lying in this, that it is
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not from love to Being in general,
but from self-love.

There is also, as has been shewn, a liking of some virtues, and dislike of some vices, from the influence of the natural instinct of pity. This men are apt to mistake for the exercise of true virtue, on many accounts. Here is not only a kind of complacence, and the objects of complacence are what have the nature of virtue, and the virtues indeed very amiable, such as humanity, mercy, tenderness of heart, &c. and the contrary very odious: but besides, the approbation is not meerly from self-love, but from compassion; an affection that re-
spect

spects others and resembles benevolence, as has been shewn.

Another reason, why the things that have been mentioned are mistaken for true virtue, is, that there is indeed a true *negative* moral goodness in them. By a negative moral goodness, I mean the negation or absence of true moral evil. They have this negative moral goodness, because a being without them would be an evidence of a much greater moral evil. Thus, the exercise of natural conscience in such and such degrees, wherein appears such a measure of an awakening or sensibility of conscience, though it be not of the nature of real positive virtue or true moral goodness, yet has a
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negative moral goodness; because in the present state of things, it is an evidence of the absence of that higher degree of wickedness, which causes great insensibility or stupidity of conscience. For sin, as was observed, is not only against a spiritual and divine sense of virtue, but is also against the dictates of that moral sense which is in natural conscience. No wonder that this sense, being long opposed and often conquered, grows weaker*. All sin has its source from selfishness, or from self-love, not subordinate to regard to Being in general †. And
 natural

* See Bp BUTLER'S Analogy, upon *habits* of Evil.

† See JONATHAN EDWARDS'S incomparable Treatise on Original Sin.

natural conscience chiefly consists in a sense of desert, or the natural agreement between sin and misery. But if self-love were indeed *all*, and so more considerable than all the world besides, there would be no ill desert in regarding one's-self above all, and making all interests give place to private interest.—And no wonder that men by long acting from the selfish principle, and by being habituated to treat themselves as if they were *all*, increase in pride, and come as it were naturally to look on themselves as *all*, and so to lose intirely the sense of ill desert in their making all other interests give place to their own.—And no wonder that men by
often

often repeating acts of sin, without punishment, or any visible appearance of approaching punishment, have less and less sense of the connection of sin with punishment.

That sense, which an awakened conscience has of the desert of sin, consists chiefly in a sense of its desert of resentment of the Deity, the foundation and head of universal existence. But no wonder that by a long continued worldly and sensual life, men more and more lose all sense of the Deity, who is a spiritual and invisible Being. The mind being long involved in, and engrossed by sensitive objects, becomes sensual in all its operations, and excludes all views and impressions

sions of spiritual objects, and is unfit for their contemplation *. Thus the conscience and general benevolence are entirely different principles, and sense of conscience differs from the holy complacency of a benevolent and truly virtuous heart. Yet wickedness may by long habitual exercise greatly diminish a sense of conscience. So that there may be negative moral goodness, in sensibility of conscience, as it may be an argument of the absence of that higher degree of wickedness, which causeth stupidity of conscience.

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* Hence people commence Advocates for, what is called, *the material System*. See HUME's Essays and philosophical Works.

So with respect to natural *gratitude*; though there may be no virtue merely in loving them who love us, yet the contrary may be an evidence of a great degree of depravity, as it may argue a higher degree of selfishness, so that a man is come to look upon himself as all, and upon others as nothing, and upon their respect and kindness as nothing. Thus an increase of pride diminishes gratitude.—So does sensuality, or the increase of sensual appetites; and coming more and more under the power and impression of sensible objects tends by degrees to make the mind insensible to any thing else; and those appetites take up the whole soul; and

and through habit and custom the water is all drawn out of other channels, in which it naturally flows, and is all carried as it were into one channel.

In like manner natural *affection*, and natural *pity*, though not of the nature of virtue, yet may be diminished greatly by the increase of those two principles of pride and sensuality; and, as the consequence of this, may bring a person to be habitually disposed to envy, malice, &c. These lusts, when they prevail to a high degree, may overcome and diminish the exercise of those natural principles: even as they often overcome and diminish common prudence in a man, as to

seeking his own private interest, in point of health, wealth or honour ; and yet, no one will think it proves that a man's being cunning in seeking his own personal and temporal interest has any thing of the nature and essence of true virtue.

Another reason why these natural principles and affections are mistaken for true virtue, is, that in several respects they have the same effect, which true virtue tends to ; especially in these two ways.

1st, The present state of the world is so ordered and constituted, by the wisdom and goodness of its supreme ruler, that these natural principles for the most part tend to the good of the world of mankind. So do
natural

natural pity, gratitude, parental affection, &c. Herein they agree with the tendency of general benevolence, which seeks and tends to the general good. But this is no proof that these natural principles have the nature of true virtue. For self-love is a principle that is exceeding useful and necessary in the world of mankind. So are the natural appetites of hunger and thirst, &c. But yet nobody will assert, that these have the nature of true virtue.

2d/y, These principles have a like effect with true virtue in this respect, that they tend several ways to restrain vice, and prevent many acts of wickedness.—So natural affec-

tion, love to our party, or to particular friends, tends to keep us from acts of injustice towards these persons; which would be real wickedness.—Pity preserves from cruelty, which would be real and great moral evil.—Natural conscience tends to restrain sin in general, in the present state of the world.—But neither can this prove these principles themselves to be of the nature of true virtue. For so is this present state of mankind ordered by a merciful God, that mens self-love does in innumerable respects restrain from acts of real wickedness, and not only so, but puts men upon seeking true virtue: yet it is not itself true virtue, but is the source
of

of all the wickedness that is in the world.

Another reason why these inferior affections, especially some of them, are accounted virtuous, is, that there are affections of the same denomination which are truly virtuous. Thus, for instance, there is a truly virtuous *pity*, or a compassion to others under affliction or misery from general benevolence. Pure benevolence would be sufficient to excite pity to another in calamity, if there were no particular instinct, or any other principle determining the mind thereto. It is easy to see how benevolence, which seeks another's good, should cause us to desire his deliverance from

evil. And this is a source of pity far more extensive than the other. It excites compassion in cases that are overlooked by natural instinct. And, even in those cases to which instinct extends, it mixes its influence with the natural principle, and guides and regulates its operations. And, when this is the case, the pity which is exercised, may be called a virtuous compassion.

So there is a virtuous *gratitude*, or a gratitude that arises not only from self-love, but from a superior principle of disinterested general benevolence. As it is manifest, that when we receive kindness from such as we love already, we are more disposed to gratitude, and dis-

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posed

posed to greater degrees of it, than when the mind is destitute of any such friendly prepossession. Therefore, when the superior principle of virtuous love has the governing hand, and regulates the affair, it may be called a virtuous gratitude.— So there is a virtuous love of *justice*, arising from pure benevolence to Being in general; as that naturally and necessarily inclines the heart, that every particular Being should have such a share of benevolence as is proportioned to its dignity, consisting in the degree of its Being, and the degree of its virtue. Which is entirely diverse from an apprehension of justice from a sense of the beauty of uniformity

ty in variety; as has been particularly shewn already. And so it is easy to see how there may be a virtuous sense of desert different from what is natural and common.—And so a virtuous *conscienciousness*, or a sanctified conscience.—And, as when *natural affections* have their operations mixed with the influence of virtuous benevolence, and are directed and determined hereby, they may be called virtuous, so there may be a virtuous love of parents to children, and between other near relatives, a virtuous love of our town, or country, or nation. Yea, and a virtuous love between the sexes, as there may be the influence of virtue mingled with instinct, and
virtue

virtue may govern with regard to the particular manner of its operation, and may guide it to such ends as are agreeable to the great ends and purposes of true virtue.

Genuine virtue prevents that increase of the habits of pride and sensuality, which tends to overbear and greatly diminish the exercises of the forementioned useful and necessary principles of nature. And a principle of general benevolence softens and sweetens the mind, and makes it more susceptible of the proper influence and exercise of the gentler natural instincts, and directs every one of them into its proper channel, and determines their exercise to the proper

proper manner and measure, and guides them all to the best purposes.

C H A P. VIII.

In what respects virtue or moral good is founded in sentiment ; and how far it is founded in the reason and nature of things.*

THAT, which is called *virtue*, is a certain kind of beautiful nature, form or quality which is observed in things. That form or quality is called *beautiful* to any one beholding it, and to whom it is beautiful, which appears in itself agreeable or comely to him ; or the
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* See SMITH's Theory of moral Sentiments.

view or idea of which is immediately pleasant to the mind. I say, agreeable *in itself* and *immediately* pleasant; to distinguish it from things which in themselves are not agreeable nor pleasant, but either indifferent or disagreeable; which yet appear eligible and agreeable indirectly, for something else which is the consequence of them, or with which they are connected. Such a kind of indirect agreeableness or eligibleness in things, not for themselves, but for something else, is not what is called beauty. But when a form or quality appears lovely, pleasing and delightful in itself, then it is called beautiful; and this agreeableness

ableness or gratefulness of the idea is what is called *beauty*.

It is evident therefore by this, that the way we come by the idea or sensation of beauty, is by the immediate sensation of the gratefulness of the idea called *beautiful**; and not by finding out by argumentation any consequences, or other things which it stands connected with, any more than tasting the sweetness of honey, or perceiving the harmony of a tune, is by argumentation or connections and consequences. And this manner of being affected with the immediate presence of the beautiful idea depends not on any reasonings about the

* See HUTCHESON on Beauty and Virtue.

the idea, after we have it, before we can find out whether it be beautiful, or not; but on the frame of our minds, whereby they are so made that such an idea, as soon as we have it, is grateful, or appears beautiful.

Therefore, if this be all that is meant by them who affirm that Virtue is founded in sentiment and not in reason; that they, who see the beauty there is in true virtue, do not perceive it by argumentation or its connections and consequences, but by the frame of their own minds; or by a certain spiritual sense given them of God, whereby they immediately perceive pleasure in the presence of the idea of true
virtue

virtue in their minds, or are directly gratified in the view or contemplation of this object; this is certainly true.

But if thereby be meant, that the frame of mind, or inward sense given them by God, whereby the mind is disposed to delight in the idea or view of true virtue, is given arbitrarily, so that if he had pleased he might have given a contrary sense and determination of mind, which would have agreed as well with the necessary nature of things; this I think is not true.

Virtue, as I have observed, consists in the cordial consent or union of Being to Being in general. And, as has also been observed,
that

that frame of mind, whereby it is disposed to relish and be pleased with the view of this, is benevolence or union of heart itself to Being in general, or an universally benevolent frame of mind: because he, whose temper is to love Being in general, therein must have a disposition to approve and be pleased with love to Being in general. Therefore now the question is, Whether God in giving this temper to a created mind, whereby it unites to or loves being in general, acts so arbitrarily, that there is nothing in the necessary nature of things to hinder but that a contrary temper might have agreed or consisted as well with that nature of things, as this.

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And, in the *first* place, I observe, that to assert this would be a plain absurdity, and contrary to the very supposition. For here it is supposed, that virtue in its very essence consists in agreement or consent of Being to Being. Now certainly agreement itself to Being in general must necessarily agree better with general existence, than opposition and contrariety to it.

I observe, *secondly*, that God in giving to the creature such a temper of mind, gave that which is agreeable to what is by absolute necessity his own temper and nature. For, as has been often observed, God himself is in effect Being in general; and without all doubt it is in itself
 necessary,

necessary, and impossible it should be otherwise, that God should agree with himself, be united to himself, or love himself: and therefore when he gives the same temper to his creatures, this is more agreeable to his necessary nature, than the opposite temper: yea, the latter would be infinitely contrary to his nature.

Let it be noted, *thirdly*, that by this temper only can created Beings be united to, and agree with one another. This appears, because it consists in consent and union to Being in general; which implies agreement and union with every particular Being, except such as are opposite to Being in general, or

excepting such cases wherein union with them is by some means inconsistent with union with general existence. But certainly, if any particular created Being were of a temper to oppose Being in general, that would infer the most universal and greatest possible discord, not only of creatures with their Creator, but of created Beings one with another.

Fourthly, I observe, that there is no other temper but this, which a man can have and agree with himself, or be without self-inconsistence, that is, without having some inclinations and relishes repugnant to others. And that, for these reasons : every Being, who has understand-

derstanding and will, necessarily loves happiness. For, to suppose any Being not to love happiness, would be to suppose he did not love what was agreeable to him; which is a contradiction; or at least would imply, that nothing was agreeable or eligible to him; which is the same as to say, that he has no such thing as choice, or any faculty of will. So that every Being, who has a faculty of will, must of necessity have an inclination to happiness. And therefore if he be consistent with himself, and have not some inclinations repugnant to others, he must approve of those inclinations, whereby Beings desire the happiness of Being in general,

and must be against a disposition to the misery of Being in general: because otherwise he would approve of opposition to his own happiness. For, if a temper inclined to the misery of Being in general prevailed universally, it is apparent, that it would tend to universal misery. But he, who loves a tendency to universal misery, in effect loves a tendency to his own misery; and as he necessarily hates his own misery, he has then one inclination repugnant to another.—And besides, it necessarily follows from self-love, that men love to be loved by others; because in this case their love agrees with their own love. But if men loved hatred to Being in general, they

they would in effect love the hatred of themselves : and so would be inconsistent with themselves, having one natural inclination contrary to another.

These things may help us to understand, why that spiritual and divine sense, by which those who are truly virtuous and holy perceive the excellency of true virtue, is in the sacred scriptures called by the name of *light, knowledge, understanding, &c.* If this divine sense were a thing arbitrarily given, without any foundation in the nature of things, it would not properly be called by such names. For if there were no correspondence or agreement in such a sense with the nature of things,

any more than there would have been in a diverse or contrary sense, the idea we obtain by this spiritual sense could in no respect be said to be a knowledge or perception of any thing besides what was in our own minds. For this idea would be no representation of any thing without. But since it is otherwise, since it is agreeable, in the respects abovementioned, to the nature of things, and especially since it is the representation and image of the moral perfection and excellency of the divine Being, hereby we have a perception of that moral excellency, of which we could have no true idea without it. And it being so, hereby persons have that true know-

knowledge of God, which greatly enlightens the mind in the knowledge of divine things in general, and does (as might be shewn, if it were necessary to the main purpose of this discourse) in many respects assist persons to a right understanding of things in general, to understand which our faculties were chiefly given us, and which do chiefly concern our interest; and helps us to see the nature of them, and the truth of them, in their proper evidence. Whereas the want of this spiritual sense, and the prevalence of those dispositions which are contrary to it, tends to darken and distract the mind, and dreadfully to delude

delude and confound the understandings of men.

And as to that moral sense, common to mankind, which there is in *natural conscience*, neither can this be truly said to be no more than a sentiment arbitrarily given by the Creator, without any relation to the necessary nature of things: but is established in an agreement with the nature of things; so as no sense of mind, that can be supposed of a contrary nature and tendency, could be. This will appear by these two things :

1st, This moral sense, if the understanding be well informed, and be exercised at liberty and in an extensive manner, without being restrained

strained to a private sphere, approves the very same things, which a spiritual and divine sense approves, and those things only ; though not on the same grounds, nor with the same kind of approbation. Therefore, as that divine sense has been already shewn to be agreeable to the necessary nature of things, so this inferior moral sense, being so far correspondent to that, must also so far agree with the nature of things.

2dly, It has been shewn, that this moral sense consists in approving the uniformity and natural agreement there is between one thing and another. So that by the supposition it is agreeable to the nature of things. For therein it consists,
namely,

namely, in a disposition of mind to consent to, or like, the agreement of the nature of things, or the agreement of the nature and form of one thing with another. And certainly such a temper of mind, as likes the agreement of things to the nature of things is more agreeable to the nature of things than an opposite temper of mind.

Here it may be observed—As the use of *language* is for mankind to express their sentiments or ideas to each other, so that those terms in language, by which things of a moral nature are signified, are to express those moral sentiments or ideas that are common to mankind; therefore it is that that moral sense;
which

which is in natural conscience, chiefly governs the use of language amongst mankind, and is the mind's rule of language in these matters among mankind; it is indeed the general natural rule which God has given to all men, whereby to judge of moral good and evil. By such words, right and wrong, good and evil, when used in a moral sense, is meant in common speech that which deserves praise or blame, respect or resentment. But, as has been often observed, mankind in general have a sense of desert by this natural moral sense*.

Therefore here may arise a question, which may deserve to be considered,

* See SMITH's Theory.

sidered, namely, Seeing it is thus, that sentiment among mankind is the rule of language, as to what is called by the name of good and evil, worthy and unworthy; and, that sentiment, at least as to many particulars, by some means or other is different in different persons, in different nations; that being thought to deserve praise by one, which by others is thought to be worthy of blame; how therefore can virtue and vice be any other than arbitrary, not at all determinable by the nature of things, but by the sentiments of men with relation to the nature of things?

In order to the answering this question with clearness, it may be divided

divided into two, namely, Whether men's sentiments of moral good and evil are not arbitrary, or rather casual and accidental? And, Whether the way of their using words in what they call good and evil, is not arbitrary, without respect to any common sentiment in all, conformed to the nature of things?

As to the first, I would observe, that the general disposition or sense of mind exercised in a sense of desert of esteem or resentment, may be the same in all; though, as to particular objects and occasions with regard to which it is exercised, it may be very various in different men or bodies of men, through the partiality or error which may at-

tend the view or attention of the mind. In all, a notion of desert of love or resentment may consist in the same thing in general, namely, in a suitability, or natural uniformity and agreement between the affections and acts of the agent, and the affections and treatment of others some way concerned; or in the natural agreement between love (or something that some way implies love, or proceeds from it, or tends to it) and love; a natural agreement between treating well and being well treated; the natural agreement between hating (or something that some way partakes of the nature of hatred) and being hated, &c. I say, this

general notion of desert may be the same: and yet occasions and objects, through variety of apprehensions about these occasions and objects, and the various manner in which they are viewed, by reason of the partial attention of the mind, may be extremely various; and example, custom, education, and association may have a hand in this, in ways innumerable. But it is needless to dwell long on this, since things which have been said by others, (Mr *Hutcheson* *, in particular) may abundantly shew, that the differences which are to be found, among different persons and na-

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tions,

* On Beauty and Virtue, Treatise II.
Sect. 4.

tions, concerning moral good and evil, are not inconsistent with a general moral sense, common to all mankind.

Nor, secondly, is the use of the words good and evil, right and wrong, when used in a moral sense, altogether unfixed and arbitrary, according to the variety of notions, opinions and views, which occasion the forementioned variety of sentiment. For though the signification of words is determined by use, yet that which governs in the use of terms is general or common sense. And mankind, in what they would signify by terms, are obliged to aim at a consistent use: because it is easily found, that the end of language,

guage, which is to be a common medium of manifesting ideas and sentiments, cannot be obtained any other way than by a consistent use of words ; both that men should be consistent with themselves and one with another, in the use of them *. But men cannot call any thing right or wrong, worthy or ill-deserving, consistently, any other way than by calling them so, which truly deserve praise or blame, that is, things wherein (all things considered) there is most uniformity in connecting with them praise or blame. There is no other way in which they can use these terms consistently with themselves.

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Thus

* See LOCKE's Essay on Human Understanding. DR SOUTH's Sermon on *Isa. v. 20.*

Thus if thieves or traitors should be angry with informers, who bring them to justice; and should call their behaviour by odious names, yet therein they would be inconsistent with themselves; because, when they put themselves in the place of those who have injured them, they approve the same thing that they condemn. And therefore such persons are capable of being convinced, that they apply these odious terms in an abusive manner. So, a nation that prosecutes an ambitious design of universal empire, by subduing other nations with fire and sword, may affix terms which signify the highest degrees of virtue, to the conduct of such as shew the
most

most engaged, stable, resolute spirit in this affair, and do most of this bloody work. But yet, they are capable of being convinced, that they use these terms inconsistently, and thereby abuse language, and so of having their mouths stopped.

And not only will men use such words inconsistently with themselves, but also with one another, by using them any otherwise than to signify true merit or ill-deserving, as before explained. For there is no way else, wherein men have any notion of good or ill desert, in which mankind in general can agree. Mankind seem to suppose some general standard or foundation in nature for an universal consistence in
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the use of the terms, whereby they express moral good and evil; which none can depart from but through error and mistake. This is evidently supposed in all disputes they may have one with another, about right and wrong; and in all endeavours used to evince or prove that any thing is either good or evil, in a moral sense.

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